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POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF TRADE: EXAMINING SURVEY DATA FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

ROGER WHITE and RICHARD CLARK*

We examine the influences of political party affiliation and self-identification as politically conservative, centrist, or liberal on individuals' trade preferences. Majority support for trade is reported for all political classifications, with Republicans found to be 13.7%–15.1% more likely than Democrats and independents to support trade. Similarly, conservatives are 14.8%–21% more likely to support trade than are centrists and liberals; however, distinctions exist between “very conservative” and “somewhat conservative” cohorts. (JEL F13)

I. INTRODUCTION

Frequently, the opinions of policymakers and the public do not mirror the views of many economists who believe that free trade is a desirable goal. Noneconomists acknowledge the associated benefits and indicate majority support for trade (Fuller and Geide-Stevenson, 2003), yet policymakers and the public often express hesitancy; for example, recent polls suggest that the public favors trade with stipulations, particularly side-agreements concerning labor and environmental standards (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2005; Warf and Kull, 2001). Trade policy is formulated based on policymakers' views and opinions, which are likely to be influenced by constituent preferences. Alternatively, constituents may align themselves with a political party due to their views on other issues and then take cues from party platforms when formulating opinions concerning trade. In either case, it is expected that party affiliation is correlated with an individual's opinion regarding trade.

Neoclassical theory predicts that while trade liberalization results in detrimental outcomes for some individuals, the removal of trade barriers is, on net, welfare improving. Accordingly, an individual's support for trade

is expected to decrease as the perceived probability of experiencing a negative trade-related outcome rises. Furthermore, one might anticipate that support for trade depends on an individual's level of risk aversion and the stake they stand to lose if, in fact, a negative outcome is realized. Thus, for the individual, concerns over community and national welfare may be tertiary, and when formulating opinions on trade, individuals may consider the likelihood that they will suffer a negative outcome and, if so, the potential associated losses.

Several papers examine the determinants of trade policy preferences (Hoffman, 2005; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2001; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001a, 2001b, 2006). Findings generally support the predictions of neoclassical trade theory; however, these studies, with the notable exception of Hoffman (2005), fail to consider the potential influence of party affiliation. Using Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks data, Hoffman finds that party affiliation influences opinions on particular trade-related events. However, this may reveal more about opinions of the particular events and involved parties than it does about general perceptions of trade. For example, Hoffman finds Democrats more likely than Republicans to hold favorable opinions of North American Free Trade Agreement, which was supported by Bill Clinton but negotiated by the George H. W. Bush administration, and Republicans

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ABBREVIATIONS

OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
TPI: Trade Perceptions Index

more likely than Democrats to view the 2002 “safeguard” steel tariffs, enacted by George W. Bush, in a positive light. We seek to reduce issue-specific influences by first examining whether responses to seven trade-related questions independently correlate with party affiliation or political conservatism/liberalism. We then consider whether a composite measure of trade preferences (labeled as a trade perceptions index [TPI]), which is constructed using the responses to the seven trade-related questions, correlates with party affiliation or political conservatism/liberalism.

Our findings support and extend the literature. Party affiliation is found to be significantly correlated with trade policy preferences, in general, and for several of the specific trade-related issues. Republicans are more likely to favor trade compared to independents and Democrats. These individuals are more likely to agree that trade creates jobs domestically, improves foreign relations, and strengthens the global economy. They also are more likely to disagree with characterizations of trade leading to worker exploitation in developing nations, environmental degradation, and increased income inequality. Conservatives are also more likely to support trade. Considering the high correlation between political conservatism and affiliation with the Republican Party, this may appear unsurprising; however, on particular trade-related issues, distinctions are reported between “very conservative” and “somewhat conservative” cohorts. Compared to respondents who identify themselves as “very liberal,” “somewhat liberal,” and “middle of the road” (hereafter referred to as “centrists”), individuals who consider themselves somewhat conservative are more likely to agree with the arguments that trade improves U.S. relations abroad and that trade leads to environmental damage. Very conservative respondents are more likely to disagree that trade leads to worker exploitation in developing nations or that trade has led to a loss of U.S. jobs due to corporations moving production abroad.

Trade preferences are also found to vary with educational attainment. High school graduates and individuals who have completed some college coursework are more likely to oppose trade. High school dropouts oppose trade on the issues of job creation and income inequality. Higher income levels signal support for trade. Asset ownership is also a determinant, with homeowners sensitive

to potentially detrimental trade-related domestic labor market outcomes. These individuals are more likely to agree that trade has led to U.S. job loss via outsourcing of domestic production. Higher average weekly earnings in the respondent’s county of residence are associated with support for trade. This may be taken as a community wealth or, possibly, an asset effect. We proceed as follows. Section II presents the estimation procedure, the data, and associated variable construction. Section III discusses the estimation results, while Section IV concludes.

II. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

The survey data we employ were collected as part of a University of Georgia Peach State Poll administered between January 31 and February 10, 2005. The poll included 800 telephone interviews of randomly selected adults; however, we employ a subset of the full sample—the 650 respondents for whom all relevant data are available—when conducting our empirical analysis. The survey was administered by landline telephone; however, this is not expected to bias the sample.¹ Tucker, Brick, and Meekins (2007) show that the characteristics of cell phone-only individuals and those who have landlines are not dramatically different, and polling data that exclude cell phones do not differ significantly from polls that include cell phones. Young adults are, however, more likely to live in cell phone-only households and, thus, are more difficult to reach. As a result, older residents are frequently overrepresented in survey data. The discussion of age in survey response has a corollary with race—with white households being easier to reach than African American households. While this may entail difficulties with respect to the ability to generalize results, it is important to note that we are less interested in making population estimates about trade attitudes than finding relationships among variables affecting these attitudes. Since data limitations preclude comparison of our data to those of other states or to a national sample, we acknowledge the potential shortcomings of our data and proceed cautiously with this in mind.

1. Interviews were conducted from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. on Saturdays, and from 2 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Sundays.

Survey respondents were presented with seven statements, prefaced by the question “Do you agree or disagree with this argument (either in favor of free trade or against free trade), or have you really not thought much about it?” Specifically, the statements were the following:

1. Free trade creates demand for U.S. products abroad, which stimulates economic growth and creates jobs here at home.
2. Free trade is good for the United States because it improves our relationships with other countries.
3. Free trade creates a strong global economy, which benefits everyone.
4. Free trade allows companies to exploit workers in developing countries with low wages, poor working conditions, and no job security.

considerable variation in responses across party affiliations and conservative/liberal classifications. Table 1 presents response frequencies for the full sample and the various classifications.

Examining the determinants of survey responses for each of the seven trade-related statements is important; however, the framing of statements may generate biased responses. Hiscox (2006) reports that framing questions in an antitrade manner reduces the likelihood that a given response indicates a favorable opinion of trade. Of the seven trade-related statements, the first three are positively framed, while the final four are negatively framed. To ameliorate the potential influence of framing, we construct a TPI as follows. Equation (1) illustrates.

$$(1) \quad \text{TPI}_i^{\text{continuous}} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^3 \left[\text{Agree}_{ij} \left(\frac{4}{3} \right) \right] + \sum_{j=4}^7 (\text{Disagree}_{ij})}{\sum_{j=1}^3 \left[(\text{Agree}_{ij} + \text{Disagree}_{ij}) \frac{4}{3} \right] + \sum_{j=4}^7 (\text{Agree}_{ij} + \text{Disagree}_{ij})}$$

5. Because of free trade, corporations have laid off American workers and sent their jobs overseas.

6. Free trade is bad for the environment because a lot of countries have lower environmental standards than the United States.

7. Free trade widens the gap between rich and poor in the United States and in the world as a whole.

Respondents also provided information regarding household income, demographic characteristics, political party affiliation, and political conservatism/liberalism. The individual statements span a variety of trade-related topics. Considering mean response values for the full sample, general agreement is found on several issues. A majority of respondents agree that trade improves U.S. foreign relations (61%) and that everyone has benefited as trade has created a strong global economy (51%). Similarly, majorities agree that trade allows companies to exploit workers in developing countries (60%), has led to domestic job loss as production has moved abroad (74%), and harms the environment (56%). We also see

The result is a “weighting-up” of responses to positively framed statements such that, collectively, these responses carry the same weight in the index as do the negatively framed statements. Subscripts denote respondent i and statement j . The TPI measure is bounded by zero and unity and provides an indication of how frequently respondents answer in support of trade.

Agreement (disagreement) with any of the first three statements or disagreement (agreement) with any of the final four statements is coded as 1 (0). Neither 0 nor 1 is recorded for individuals indicating that they have “not thought much about” an issue. For example, if a respondent agrees with Statements 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 and disagrees with Statements 2 and 6, then the TPI value is equal to 0.4583. Similarly, if a respondent agrees with Statements 2, 3, and 7 but offers neither agreement nor disagreement with any remaining issue, the TPI value is equal to 0.7273. Thus, in the latter case, it is assumed that the individual bases preferences toward trade on a more narrow set of issues.

The reliability of the TPI variable is established by examining the intercorrelation

TABLE 1
Response Frequencies

	Statement 1			Statement 2			Statement 3			Statement 4		
	Agree	Disagree	Haven't Thought About	Agree	Disagree	Haven't Thought About	Agree	Disagree	Haven't Thought About	Agree	Disagree	Haven't Thought About
All (N = 650)	0.473 (0.5)	0.315 (0.465)	0.195 (0.396)	0.614 (0.487)	0.28 (0.449)	0.09 (0.286)	0.51 (0.5)	0.353 (0.478)	0.119 (0.324)	0.595 (0.491)	0.249 (0.433)	0.129 (0.335)
Republican (n = 292)	0.502 (0.501)	0.27 (0.445)	0.215 (0.412)	0.65 (0.478)	0.244 (0.43)	0.1 (0.3)	0.556 (0.498)	0.322 (0.468)	0.109 (0.313)	0.54 (0.499)	0.28 (0.45)	0.158 (0.365)
Democrat (n = 190)	0.422 (0.495)	0.357 (0.48)	0.201 (0.402)	0.578 (0.495)	0.296 (0.458)	0.106 (0.308)	0.477 (0.501)	0.367 (0.483)	0.126 (0.332)	0.603 (0.491)	0.256 (0.438)	0.121 (0.326)
Independent (n = 168)	0.444 (0.498)	0.376 (0.486)	0.159 (0.366)	0.566 (0.497)	0.333 (0.473)	0.079 (0.271)	0.455 (0.499)	0.402 (0.492)	0.122 (0.328)	0.677 (0.469)	0.19 (0.394)	0.101 (0.302)
Very conservative (n = 129)	0.488 (0.501)	0.263 (0.441)	0.231 (0.423)	0.625 (0.486)	0.244 (0.431)	0.125 (0.332)	0.55 (0.499)	0.288 (0.454)	0.15 (0.358)	0.531 (0.501)	0.281 (0.451)	0.169 (0.376)
Somewhat conservative (n = 194)	0.478 (0.501)	0.33 (0.471)	0.174 (0.38)	0.652 (0.477)	0.257 (0.438)	0.083 (0.276)	0.535 (0.5)	0.361 (0.481)	0.087 (0.282)	0.591 (0.493)	0.278 (0.449)	0.109 (0.312)
Centrist (n = 209)	0.44 (0.497)	0.357 (0.48)	0.191 (0.394)	0.598 (0.491)	0.324 (0.469)	0.062 (0.242)	0.452 (0.499)	0.407 (0.492)	0.124 (0.331)	0.639 (0.481)	0.203 (0.403)	0.133 (0.34)
Somewhat liberal (n = 78)	0.46 (0.501)	0.356 (0.482)	0.172 (0.38)	0.54 (0.501)	0.322 (0.47)	0.103 (0.306)	0.494 (0.503)	0.356 (0.482)	0.126 (0.334)	0.632 (0.485)	0.241 (0.43)	0.092 (0.291)
Very liberal (n = 40)	0.48 (0.505)	0.22 (0.418)	0.28 (0.454)	0.58 (0.499)	0.26 (0.443)	0.16 (0.37)	0.46 (0.503)	0.4 (0.495)	0.12 (0.328)	0.6 (0.495)	0.22 (0.418)	0.14 (0.351)

	Statement 5			Statement 6			Statement 7		
	Agree	Disagree	Haven't Thought About	Agree	Disagree	Haven't Thought About	Agree	Disagree	Haven't Thought About
All (N = 650)	0.736 (0.441)	0.188 (0.391)	0.06 (0.238)	0.556 (0.497)	0.254 (0.435)	0.166 (0.373)	0.43 (0.495)	0.365 (0.482)	0.176 (0.381)
Republican (n = 292)	0.695 (0.461)	0.225 (0.418)	0.071 (0.257)	0.524 (0.5)	0.286 (0.453)	0.167 (0.374)	0.402 (0.491)	0.399 (0.49)	0.177 (0.382)
Democrat (n = 190)	0.754 (0.432)	0.176 (0.382)	0.05 (0.219)	0.518 (0.501)	0.246 (0.432)	0.206 (0.405)	0.402 (0.492)	0.362 (0.482)	0.216 (0.413)
Independent (n = 168)	0.815 (0.389)	0.138 (0.345)	0.032 (0.176)	0.656 (0.476)	0.201 (0.402)	0.127 (0.334)	0.534 (0.5)	0.307 (0.462)	0.127 (0.334)
Very conservative (n = 129)	0.775 (0.419)	0.169 (0.376)	0.05 (0.219)	0.538 (0.5)	0.238 (0.427)	0.2 (0.401)	0.375 (0.486)	0.4 (0.491)	0.2 (0.401)
Somewhat conservative (n = 194)	0.73 (0.445)	0.209 (0.407)	0.048 (0.214)	0.583 (0.494)	0.283 (0.451)	0.113 (0.317)	0.461 (0.5)	0.37 (0.484)	0.148 (0.356)
Centrist (n = 209)	0.751 (0.433)	0.158 (0.365)	0.075 (0.263)	0.593 (0.492)	0.207 (0.406)	0.174 (0.38)	0.477 (0.501)	0.32 (0.467)	0.183 (0.387)
Somewhat liberal (n = 78)	0.747 (0.437)	0.184 (0.39)	0.046 (0.211)	0.517 (0.503)	0.276 (0.45)	0.195 (0.399)	0.448 (0.5)	0.356 (0.482)	0.161 (0.37)
Very liberal (n = 40)	0.66 (0.479)	0.2 (0.404)	0.1 (0.303)	0.5 (0.505)	0.26 (0.443)	0.2 (0.404)	0.36 (0.485)	0.38 (0.49)	0.22 (0.418)

Notes: The statements are the following: (1) Free trade creates demand for U.S. products abroad, which stimulates economic growth and creates jobs here at home; (2) Free trade is good for the United States because it improves our relationships with other countries; (3) Free trade creates a strong global economy, which benefits everyone; (4) Free trade allows companies to exploit workers in developing countries with low wages, poor working conditions, and no job security; (5) Because of free trade, corporations have laid off American workers and sent their jobs overseas; (6) Free trade is bad for the environment because a lot of countries have lower environmental standards than the United States; (7) Free trade widens the gap between rich and poor in the United States and in the world as a whole. Standard deviations are in parentheses. In some instances, response frequencies do not sum to 1 as some individuals refused to provide responses to certain statements. Interviewers prefaced all statements listed with, "Do you agree or disagree with this argument (either in favor of free trade or against free trade), or have you really not thought much about it?"

among responses to the trade-related statements. Cronbach's alpha is a coefficient of reliability, or consistency, which indicates, on a 0–1 scale, how well a set of items measure a latent (underlying) variable.² It is applied to multivariate scales to assess the degree to which scale items (responses to statements relating to trade, in this case) correlate with one another. We have developed a set of items that, combined, may indicate one's views on a multifaceted construct: support for free trade. Generally, an alpha coefficient above 0.7 is assumed to indicate a sufficient level of reliability; however, alpha values in excess of 0.9 usually indicate the existence of redundant items. When constructing our index value, employing responses to all seven statements yields an alpha coefficient of 0.81. Exclusion of individual statements results in alpha values that range from 0.77 to 0.8. Thus, the overall reliability of our constructed TPI variable is high, and using responses to all seven trade-related statements yields the most reliable index measure.

The continuous TPI measure could be regressed on a vector of explanatory variables; however, due to problems associated with bounded dependent variables, we instead construct a binary TPI variable that is based on the continuous TPI values and employ a logistic function. We construct our dependent variable as follows:

$$(2) \quad \text{TPI}_i^{\text{binary}} = 1 \text{ if } 1 \geq \text{TPI}_i^{\text{continuous}} \geq 0.5, \\ 0 \text{ otherwise.}$$

The binary TPI measure categorizes individuals as supporting or opposing trade. For any statement, responses are assumed to be a function of individual characteristics, Θ , including age, annual household income per adult, race, ethnicity, gender, education, and homeowner status. Average weekly earnings in the respondent's county of residence, Γ , is also included to capture potential local area asset effects (University of Georgia, Center for Agribusiness and Economic Development, 2004). To examine the potential influence of political affiliation, we include the vector Φ , which contains dummy variables that identify respondents as Republicans or Democrats.

2. The formula for calculating the alpha coefficient is $\frac{N \times \bar{p}}{1 + ((N-1) \times \bar{p})}$, where N is the number of items or dimensions and \bar{p} is the average intercorrelation among items.

Equation (3) illustrates. The vector Ψ includes four dummy variables (very conservative, somewhat conservative, somewhat liberal, and very liberal) and can be substituted into Equation (3) for Φ to permit evaluation of conservative and liberal influences on trade preferences.³

$$(3) \quad \Pr(\text{TPI}_i^{\text{binary}} = 1) = \frac{e^{(\alpha + \beta_{\Theta} \Theta_i + \beta_{\Phi} \Phi_i + \beta_{\Gamma} \Gamma_k + \varepsilon_{ik})}}{1 + e^{(\alpha + \beta_{\Theta} \Theta_i + \beta_{\Phi} \Phi_i + \beta_{\Gamma} \Gamma_k + \varepsilon_{ik})}}$$

Included explanatory variables are consistent with prior research that has found demographic attributes to be indicative of trade preferences. Women and older individuals are more likely to favor protection (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2001). Economic literacy affects opinions on policy issues, making more educated individuals relatively more likely to agree with the views of economists (Walstad, 1997). Blinder and Krueger (2004) conclude that education increases the likelihood that an individual will be well informed regarding economic policy issues, and Hoffman (2005) reports that college education is the factor most likely to make individuals favor trade. Individuals who earn higher incomes tend to hold positive opinions of trade (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) posit that homeowners in labor-intensive areas view protection as a means of protecting/increasing property values.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample and each classification. Overall, support for trade appears slightly guarded. Both the continuous (47%) and the binary (49%) TPI measures have mean values slightly below one-half. Generally speaking, Republicans and individuals who are somewhat or very conservative provide responses indicating a significantly more favorable view of trade. Republicans are more likely to own their own home and to be white, and average income per adult tends to be higher in Republican households.⁴

3. When conducting our analysis, the null/excluded groups are "independents" (when respondents are identified as Democrats or Republicans) and "centrists" (when liberal/conservative self-classifications are included).

4. Although the homeownership variable may be endogenously determined, excluding the variable from the estimation equation does not significantly alter the results. Ancillary estimation results, such as those where the homeownership variable is excluded, are available upon request from the authors.

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	All	<i>n</i>	Democrat	<i>n</i>	Independent	<i>n</i>	Republican	<i>n</i>
TPI (continuous)	0.4704 (0.3319)	354	0.4324 (0.3233)	101	0.4285 (0.329)	104	0.5252* (0.328)	149
TPI (binary)	0.4917 (0.5003)	650	0.4462 (0.4984)	190	0.4247# (0.4956)	168	0.5705* (0.4958)	292
Annual income per adult (in household)	33,869 (23,463)	650	32,228 (25,655)	190	32,179 (22,571)	168	37,523* (22,062)	292
African American	0.1450 (0.3523)	650	0.3216** (0.4683)	190	0.1534 (0.3614)	168	0.0225** (0.1486)	292
Asian	0.0050 (0.0706)	650	0.0000* (0)	190	0.0106 (0.1026)	168	0.0032 (0.0567)	292
Hispanic	0.0138 (0.1165)	650	0.0201 (0.1407)	190	0.0212 (0.1443)	168	0.0064 (0.0801)	292
White	0.7725 (0.4195)	650	0.6030** (0.4905)	190	0.7460 (0.4364)	168	0.9389** (0.2399)	292
Female	0.5338 (0.4992)	650	0.6533** (0.4771)	190	0.4180** (0.4945)	168	0.5466 (0.4986)	292
Average weekly earnings (in county of residence)	607.4 (159.1)	650	596.7 (170.4)	190	627.1 (174.6)	168	596.4 (142.2)	292
Age	50.53 (15.775)	650	50.05 (15.705)	190	48.21# (15.034)	168	52.1 (15.861)	292
High school dropout	0.0800 (0.2715)	650	0.1156 (0.3205)	190	0.0741 (0.2626)	168	0.0450* (0.2077)	292
High school graduate	0.2100 (0.4076)	650	0.2060 (0.4055)	190	0.1958 (0.3978)	168	0.2251 (0.4183)	292
Some college	0.2575 (0.4375)	650	0.2563 (0.4377)	190	0.2487 (0.4334)	168	0.2637 (0.4413)	292
College (4-yr) graduate	0.2550 (0.4361)	650	0.1859* (0.39)	190	0.2804 (0.4504)	168	0.2894 (0.4542)	292
Some postgraduate education	0.0500 (0.2181)	650	0.0503 (0.219)	190	0.0476 (0.2135)	168	0.0611 (0.2399)	292
Postgraduate diploma	0.1375 (0.3446)	650	0.1809 (0.3859)	190	0.1323 (0.3397)	168	0.1125 (0.3165)	292
Homeowner	0.8113 (0.3916)	650	0.8040 (0.398)	190	0.7831 (0.4133)	168	0.8842** (0.3204)	292

Variable	Very Liberal	<i>n</i>	Somewhat Liberal	<i>n</i>	Centrist	<i>n</i>	Somewhat Conservative	<i>n</i>	Very Conservative	<i>n</i>
TPI (continuous)	0.4648 (0.3493)	20	0.4244 (0.3449)	43	0.4278# (0.3157)	122	0.5203* (0.3302)	106	0.4737 (0.3303)	63
TPI (binary)	0.5102 (0.5051)	40	0.4353 (0.4987)	78	0.4195# (0.4945)	209	0.5664* (0.4967)	194	0.4968 (0.5016)	129
Annual income per adult (in household)	37,450 (31,560)	40	33,819 (24,413)	78	34,959 (23,658)	209	34,549 (21,450)	194	32,927 (22,844)	129
African American	0.2000 (0.4041)	40	0.1494 (0.3586)	78	0.195# (0.397)	209	0.1217 (0.3277)	194	0.0875* (0.2835)	129
Asian	0.0200 (0.1414)	40	0.0115 (0.1072)	78	0.0041 (0.0644)	209	0.0043 (0.0659)	194	0.0000* (0)	129
Hispanic	0.0600 (0.2399)	40	0.0000** (0)	78	0.0124 (0.1111)	209	0.0130 (0.1137)	194	0.0125 (0.1115)	129
White	0.6000* (0.4949)	40	0.7356 (0.4436)	78	0.7220 (0.449)	209	0.8261# (0.3799)	194	0.8625** (0.3455)	129
Female	0.4600 (0.5035)	40	0.6092 (0.4908)	78	0.5187 (0.5007)	209	0.5130 (0.5009)	194	0.5563 (0.4984)	129

continued

TABLE 2
continued

Variable	Very Liberal	n	Somewhat Liberal	n	Centrist	n	Somewhat Conservative	n	Very Conservative	n
Average weekly earnings (in county of residence)	591.5 (170.3)	40	603.6 (163.8)	78	624.3 (170.2)	209	601.4 (149.8)	194	587.3 (146.4)	129
Age	48.9 (15.52)	40	49.69 (16.19)	78	49.9 (15.69)	209	50.69 (15.21)	194	51.52 (16.16)	129
High school dropout	0.1600 (0.3703)	40	0.0575 (0.2341)	78	0.0830 (0.2764)	209	0.0348** (0.1836)	194	0.0500 (0.2186)	129
High school graduate	0.2400 (0.4314)	40	0.1954 (0.3988)	78	0.1826 (0.3871)	209	0.2000 (0.4009)	194	0.2563 (0.4379)	129
Some college	0.1200** (0.3283)	40	0.2184 (0.4155)	78	0.2573 (0.438)	209	0.2913 (0.4554)	194	0.3125 (0.465)	129
College (4-yr) graduate	0.2200 (0.4185)	40	0.2414 (0.4304)	78	0.2697 (0.4447)	209	0.2913 (0.4554)	194	0.2313 (0.423)	129
Some postgraduate education	0.0000** (0)	40	0.0805 (0.2736)	78	0.0664 (0.2495)	209	0.0478 (0.2139)	194	0.0375 (0.1906)	129
Postgraduate diploma	0.2200 (0.4185)	40	0.2069 (0.4074)	78	0.1369 (0.3445)	209	0.1304 (0.3375)	194	0.1000 (0.3009)	129
Homeowner	0.7000 (0.4629)	40	0.7701 (0.4232)	78	0.8257 (0.3801)	209	0.8348 (0.3722)	194	0.8500 (0.3582)	129

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

*, **, and # indicate statistical significance from the overall mean at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Democrat respondents are more likely to be female and less likely to be white or college graduates. The correlation between an individual identifying themselves as Republican and as conservative (somewhat or very) is 0.46. Similarly, the correlation for Democratic affiliation and liberal self-identification is 0.32. This explains the commonality in mean response values between party and conservative/liberal classifications. It also indicates that, in the empirical analysis to follow, examination of conservatives and liberals provides a more detailed portrait of party affiliation.

III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Examination of the determinants of trade preferences is first carried out for each of the seven statements employed to construct the TPI measure. This presents an opportunity to examine issue-specific influences on preferences. We then examine the determinants of the binary TPI measure to determine the influence of each explanatory variable on overall trade preferences. Section IIIA presents the results for the former, while Section IIIB presents those for the latter.

A. Policy Preferences for Specific Trade-Related Issues

Table 3 presents coefficients generated via estimation of the logit specification presented in Equation (3). Across all issues, except the outsourcing of domestic jobs overseas, Republicans exhibit greater support for trade compared to Democrats and (the control group) independents. Results of estimating our specification, modified such that party affiliation is replaced by conservative/liberal classifications, are presented in Table 4. Support among conservatives mirrors that of Republicans; however, variation exists between very conservative and somewhat conservative cohorts in terms of coefficient magnitudes and level/incidence of significance.

Republicans are more likely to agree with the arguments that trade leads to increased foreign demand for U.S. goods and that job creation results, improves U.S. foreign relations, and benefits everyone as it creates a strong global economy. These same respondents are more likely to disagree with the arguments that trade leads to worker exploitation

TABLE 3
Party Affiliation and Trade Policy Preferences

Dependent Variable	Statement 1	Statement 2	Statement 3	Statement 4	Statement 5	Statement 6	Statement 7
Republican	1.0243** (0.2324)	0.3776# (0.214)	0.7179** (0.2126)	-0.4385# (0.2317)	-0.2975 (0.2536)	-0.4216# (0.2352)	-0.6056** (0.2257)
Democrat	0.2051 (0.2528)	0.2618 (0.2417)	0.2527 (0.2363)	0.2565 (0.282)	0.0697 (0.2972)	0.1541 (0.2813)	0.1835 (0.2585)
Age	-0.0106# (0.0063)	-0.0071 (0.0059)	-0.0076 (0.0057)	0.0096 (0.0064)	0.0051 (0.0069)	-0.0066 (0.0063)	0.0003 (0.0062)
Annual income per adult (in household; \$1,000s)	0.0054 (0.0045)	0.0026 (0.0043)	-0.0009 (0.0041)	-0.0033 (0.0045)	-0.0056 (0.0049)	-0.0056 (0.0045)	-0.0096* (0.0044)
Average weekly earnings (in county of residence)	0.0011# (0.0006)	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0015** (0.0006)	-0.0003 (0.0006)	-0.001 (0.0007)	-0.0012* (0.0006)	-0.0014* (0.0006)
African American	-0.1644 (0.2834)	-0.0604 (0.2671)	-0.0698 (0.2638)	0.2432 (0.3272)	0.1874 (0.3407)	0.0704 (0.3099)	0.3073 (0.293)
Asian	27.7153 (1297050)	28.3078 (1377480)	28.3553 (1286040)	0.4305 (1.262)	-0.6475 (1.4755)	-0.7527 (1.2577)	0.0051 (1.2642)
Hispanic	1.3192 (1.1134)	1.2885 (1.0917)	1.4882 (1.1088)	-1.9161* (0.8728)	-0.1684 (0.8296)	-3.1992** (1.0864)	-0.0049 (0.8958)
Female	-0.3553# (0.1956)	0.1504 (0.1836)	-0.1732 (0.1799)	0.0261 (0.1998)	0.2648 (0.2177)	0.1896 (0.2026)	-0.0849 (0.1937)
High school dropout	-0.917* (0.4673)	-0.557 (0.4304)	-0.7878# (0.4324)	-0.6908 (0.4514)	-0.3877 (0.4531)	0.3783 (0.4946)	1.2166* (0.4863)
High school graduate	-1.0085** (0.3246)	-0.6574* (0.3005)	-0.6147* (0.2899)	0.6646* (0.3109)	0.5428 (0.3367)	0.9261** (0.3265)	1.2305** (0.3078)
Some college	-0.8097** (0.3017)	-0.5354# (0.2858)	-0.4599# (0.2685)	0.7767** (0.296)	0.792* (0.3288)	0.4582 (0.2919)	1.0234** (0.2867)
College (4-yr) graduate	-0.5552# (0.2991)	-0.0799 (0.2921)	-0.1388 (0.2715)	0.5912* (0.2818)	0.4041 (0.3069)	0.01 (0.2835)	0.4645# (0.2801)
Homeowner	-0.6249* (0.2618)	-0.2608 (0.2408)	-0.2986 (0.2341)	0.3398 (0.2615)	0.7641** (0.2625)	0.4682# (0.2542)	-0.0496 (0.2548)
Constant	0.9474 (0.619)	1.0763# (0.5864)	0.1927 (0.5609)	0.1265 (0.6017)	0.9728 (0.6415)	1.52* (0.6181)	0.9066 (0.594)
N	523	597	581	565	616	538	533
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.10

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. Dependent variables are alternative measures of trade policy preferences. *, **, and # indicate significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

TABLE 4
 Conservative/Liberal Self-Classification and Trade Policy Preferences

Dependent Variable	Statement 1	Statement 2	Statement 3	Statement 4	Statement 5	Statement 6	Statement 7
Very conservative	0.7097** (0.2722)	0.3038 (0.2627)	0.4901# (0.2532)	-0.604* (0.2798)	-0.6499* (0.297)	-0.3637 (0.2967)	-0.7548** (0.2784)
Somewhat conservative	0.9877** (0.2465)	0.461* (0.2326)	0.5876** (0.2236)	-0.3847 (0.2492)	-0.2334 (0.2793)	-0.5935* (0.2493)	-0.4121# (0.2363)
Somewhat liberal	0.1224 (0.3225)	-0.1792 (0.2924)	0.1598 (0.2927)	0.2530 (0.349)	-0.1130 (0.367)	-0.2718 (0.3467)	0.1200 (0.3179)
Very liberal	0.2618 (0.4063)	-0.2061 (0.389)	0.0951 (0.3866)	0.0915 (0.4403)	0.1126 (0.505)	-0.4022 (0.4386)	0.3956 (0.4446)
Age	-0.0090 (0.0063)	-0.0073 (0.0059)	-0.0073 (0.0057)	0.0096 (0.0064)	0.0057 (0.0069)	-0.0066 (0.0064)	0.0010 (0.0062)
Annual income per adult (in household; \$1,000s)	0.008# (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.004)
Average weekly earnings (in county of residence)	0.0011# (0.0006)	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0015** (0.0006)	-0.0003 (0.0006)	-0.0010 (0.0007)	-0.0012* (0.0006)	-0.0014* (0.0006)
African American	-0.3414 (0.2708)	-0.0439 (0.2549)	-0.1586 (0.2491)	0.4000 (0.3149)	0.2531 (0.3262)	0.2307 (0.2955)	0.5235# (0.2809)
Asian	28.1283 (1246720)	28.4796 (1373290)	28.5896 (1246500)	0.1419 (1.2786)	-0.8268 (1.5198)	-0.8969 (1.2785)	-0.3575 (1.2628)
Hispanic	1.0551 (1.1023)	1.2457 (1.1028)	1.3046 (1.1034)	-1.849* (0.882)	-0.1143 (0.8406)	-3.1367** (1.0886)	0.0418 (0.9425)
Female	-0.2927 (0.1922)	0.2044 (0.182)	-0.1077 (0.1764)	0.0208 (0.1978)	0.2718 (0.2163)	0.2012 (0.202)	-0.0902 (0.1914)
High school dropout	-0.7284 (0.476)	-0.5362 (0.4391)	-0.7394# (0.4366)	-0.7324 (0.4587)	-0.4572 (0.4618)	0.2788 (0.4992)	1.2452* (0.4939)
High school graduate	-0.9703** (0.3227)	-0.7028* (0.3022)	-0.5585# (0.2877)	0.6366* (0.3112)	0.5452 (0.3386)	0.8741** (0.3271)	1.1912** (0.308)
Some college	-0.8086** (0.3041)	-0.6161* (0.2889)	-0.4644# (0.2684)	0.808** (0.2981)	0.8352* (0.3321)	0.4176 (0.2936)	1.0725** (0.2893)
College (4-yr) graduate	-0.4894 (0.2977)	-0.1285 (0.2923)	-0.1050 (0.2698)	0.5528* (0.2811)	0.3928 (0.3061)	-0.0555 (0.283)	0.4397 (0.2809)
Homeowner	-0.4995# (0.2587)	-0.2652 (0.2428)	-0.2596 (0.233)	0.3648 (0.2624)	0.7762** (0.2642)	0.4150 (0.2536)	-0.0618 (0.2547)
Constant	0.6339 (0.6413)	1.1538# (0.6056)	0.0933 (0.5768)	0.2287 (0.626)	1.0833 (0.6648)	1.7611** (0.6367)	0.9312 (0.6181)
N	523	597	581	565	616	538	533
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.10

Note: See Table 3 notes.

in developing countries, is bad for the environment, and increases income inequality both domestically and abroad.

Somewhat conservative and very conservative individuals are more likely, compared to liberals and (the control group) centrists, to agree that trade creates domestic jobs via increased foreign demand and strengthens the global economy. These individuals disagree with the statement that trade increases income inequality both domestically and abroad. Very conservative individuals are less likely to agree that trade leads to exploitation of foreign workers and domestic job loss due to outsourcing of production abroad. Somewhat conservative individuals are more likely to agree that trade improves U.S. foreign relations and are less likely to agree that trade harms the environment.

The remaining explanatory variables offer additional interesting information. High school graduates and individuals who have completed some college coursework are more likely, in response to all statements, to oppose trade. High school dropouts and college graduates are less likely to agree that trade creates domestic jobs and more likely to agree that trade increases income inequality, both within the United States and abroad. College graduates also are more likely to agree that trade leads to worker exploitation abroad. Higher average weekly earnings in the respondent's county of residence are positively associated with trade support. Homeowners are less likely to agree that an expanding export sector creates U.S. jobs and are more likely to disagree with the idea of trade leading to outsourcing of domestic jobs as production is moved abroad and that trade damages the environment. Finally, Hispanics seem to hold favorable opinions of trade.

B. Overall Trade Policy Preferences

Estimation results generated from use of the TPI are presented in Table 5. Columns (a) and (c) present results from estimations that regress the binary TPI measure described in Section II on the set of explanatory variables. Columns (b) and (d) present results of estimating the same specification with an alternative TPI measure. This alternative (restricted) TPI variable is constructed using survey responses from only those individuals

who responded in agreement or disagreement to all seven trade-related statements. The restriction is made to generate a set of respondents who have clear opinions on all issues. Such individuals may be better informed than the remaining respondents with respect to trade policy.

The significant opposition to certain trade-related issues among high school dropouts that was reported in Tables 3 and 4 has disappeared with adoption of the composite dependent variable. These individuals have strong antitrade opinions when confined to job-related issues; however, clear opinions either supporting or opposing trade are not evident for other issues. High school graduates and individuals who have completed some college are less likely to support trade, regardless of specification. Higher income, represented by income per adult in the respondent's household, is a significant factor in determining support for trade. African American respondents appear generally less likely to support trade. A similar finding, albeit at a reduced level of significance, is reported for homeowners. Columns (b) and (d) indicate that for the individuals who have offered an opinion on all trade-related statements, the more mature individuals are more likely to oppose trade.

Republicans and conservatives are more likely to support trade, regardless of specification. Applying the log-odds coefficients reported in Table 5 and the corresponding mean values for the full sample (presented in Table 2) to Equation (3), we estimate that, all else equal, Republicans are 13.7%–15.1% more likely to support trade as compared to Democrats or independents. Additionally, contrary to the results presented for the individual trade-related statements, no significant difference in support for trade is found between very conservative and somewhat conservative individuals. However, individuals who identify themselves as very conservative are 14.8%–21% more likely to favor trade as compared to liberals and centrists. Similarly, individuals who are somewhat conservative are an estimated 16.7%–20.8% more likely to favor trade.

Constructing estimates of the probability that each respondent supports trade based on the individual's characteristics, those of their county of residence, and the significant coefficients presented in Table 5 permits comparison of estimated probability distributions

TABLE 5
Trade Policy Preferences Index—Party Affiliation and Liberal/Conservative Self-Classification

Dependent Variable	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
	TPI	Restricted TPI	TPI	Restricted TPI
Republican	0.6244** (0.1992)	0.5621* (0.2728)	0.6101* (0.2381)	0.8942** (0.3407)
Democrat	0.1953 (0.225)	-0.0226 (0.3117)	0.6998** (0.2119)	0.8874** (0.2966)
Very conservative			0.1574 (0.2837)	0.0860 (0.4026)
Somewhat conservative			0.2533 (0.3729)	0.1396 (0.5255)
Somewhat liberal			-0.0072 (0.0054)	-0.0191* (0.008)
Very liberal			0.0097* (0.004)	0.0134** (0.0052)
Age	-0.0076 (0.0054)	-0.0174* (0.0079)		
Annual income per adult (in household; \$1,000s)	0.008* (0.004)	0.0113* (0.005)		
Average weekly earnings (in county of residence)	0.0012* (0.0005)	0.0016* (0.0007)	0.0013* (0.0005)	0.0017* (0.0007)
African American	-0.5306* (0.2559)	-0.4655 (0.3543)	-0.6031* (0.2455)	-0.5602 ^p = 0.1049) (0.3454)
Asian	28.5866 (0.1E+07)	28.6137 (0.2E+07)	28.8332 (1.2E+06)	29.1505 (0.1E+07)
Hispanic	1.3557 ^p = 0.1027) (0.8308)	1.4246 (1.1731)	1.2323 ^p = 0.1383) (0.8315)	1.1688 (1.1742)
Female	-0.0612 (0.1696)	-0.3265 (0.2373)	-0.0095 (0.1676)	-0.3421 ^p = 0.1495) (0.2373)
High school dropout	-0.2609 (0.3878)	0.121 (0.6671)	-0.1469 (0.3954)	0.2199 (0.6864)
High school graduate	-0.669* (0.273)	-0.8928* (0.3594)	-0.6261* (0.2728)	-0.9677** (0.3634)
Some college	-0.5794* (0.2551)	-0.813* (0.3334)	-0.5919* (0.2573)	-0.8533** (0.3419)
College (4-yr) graduate	-0.2053 (0.2544)	-0.2513 (0.3285)	-0.1729 (0.254)	-0.2812 (0.3359)
Homeowner	-0.3451 ^p = 0.1165) (0.2199)	-0.4757 ^p = 0.1218) (0.3074)	-0.2947 (0.2197)	-0.4806 ^p = 0.1244) (0.3123)
Constant	-0.2837 (0.52)	0.1869 (0.7396)	-0.5244 (0.5407)	-0.0369 (0.7737)
N	650	354	650	354
Pseudo R ²	0.06	0.12	0.06	0.11

Notes: See Table 3 notes. *p* values are noted, for estimated coefficients significant at the 15% level, in parentheses to the immediate right of estimated coefficients.


TABLE 6
Mean Predicted Probabilities, by Group and Specification

	Specification a					Specification b				
	<i>n</i>	Mean Probability	Minimum	Maximum	% > 50%	<i>n</i>	Mean Probability	Minimum	Maximum	% > 50%
Republican	292	78.96 (0.0749)	58.42	94.05	100.00	149	63.99 (0.1411)	30.26	89.16	77.80
Democrat	190	62.99 (0.1342)	35.84	89.44	83.30	101	51.96 (0.1619)	21.72	83.59	52.70
Independent	168	65.79 (0.1103)	37.15	86.63	93.29	104	53.89 (0.1476)	26.81	79.76	59.57
Total		70.88 (0.1277)			93.38	Total	57.86 (0.1586)			65.31

	Specification c					Specification d				
	<i>n</i>	Mean Probability	Minimum	Maximum	% > 50%	<i>n</i>	Mean Probability	Minimum	Maximum	% > 50%
Very conservative	129	77.39 (0.0857)	50.63	93.13	100.00	63	67.89 (0.1313)	37.34	88.34	87.10
Somewhat conservative	194	79.54 (0.0818)	54.7	94.14	100.00	106	68.24 (0.1507)	34.53	92.28	86.50
Centrist	209	67.03 (0.1195)	35.79	90.3	94.09	122	52.71 (0.157)	22.95	83.7	54.17
Somewhat liberal	78	67.59 (0.1151)	40.57	90.3	94.70	43	62.99 (0.1622)	21.06	79.96	54.80
Very liberal	40	67.23 (0.1263)	36.63	90.3	94.90	20	51.97 (0.1433)	30	72.24	55.00
Total		72.90 (0.1179)			97.15	Total	60.34 (0.1685)			69.82

Notes: Presented "Total" values are derived as weighted mean values. Mean probability values are constructed based on survey respondent characteristics and estimated coefficients presented in Table 5 that correspond to the specifications indicated in this table. Standard deviations are in parentheses. *t*-tests of the difference in mean values were employed to determine group mean significance from the overall mean. All mean values, for all party affiliation and conservative/liberal classifications, are significantly different from the respective overall mean values at the 5% or higher level.

FIGURE 1
 Estimated Probabilities, by Party Affiliation (Specification a)



across political party affiliations and conservative/liberal classifications. Table 6 reports the summary statistics, while Figures 1–4 present mean probabilities and associated distributions and illustrate the cleavage between Republicans and Democrats or independents and between conservatives and liberals or centrists. Mean probability values derived for each specification are reported in Table 5. Broadly speaking, support for trade is found across all political classifications; however, Republicans and conservatives have, on average, higher estimated probabilities, as expected, given the coefficient estimates presented in Table 3. Examination of the minimum and maximum estimated probabilities

for each cohort reveals considerable overlap of distributions. Furthermore, we see that more than 90% of the estimated probabilities are greater than 50% when the unrestricted TPI measure is employed as the dependent variable. Roughly two-thirds of the probabilities exceed 50% when the restricted TPI measure is employed.

C. Robustness Checks

Although the TPI variable is continuous over the (0, 1) interval, we have employed a binary variable in our empirical analysis. This binary reclassification leads to a loss of information that may have important

FIGURE 2
 Estimated Probabilities, by Party Affiliation (Specification b)




FIGURE 3

Estimated Probabilities, by Conservative/Liberal Classification (Specification c)





FIGURE 4

Estimated Probabilities, by Conservative/Liberal Classification (Specification d)



implications for our results. Application of ordinary least squares (OLS) when regressing the continuous TPI variable on the set of explanatory variables would result in inefficient coefficient estimates due to the dependent variable being bounded by 0 and 1. An alternative estimation strategy would entail logistically transforming the continuous TPI variable so that the dependent variable becomes $\ln\left(\frac{TPI^{continuous}}{1-TPI^{continuous}}\right)$.⁵ Performing this transformation and reestimating the specifications detailed in Table 5 produce results that are quite consistent with the results obtained from the logit

estimations when the binary TPI variable is used as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Columns (a) through (d) of Table 7.

Another alternative estimation method is to employ the continuous TPI variable as the dependent variable and to apply the tobit technique with lower and upper limits set at 0 and 1, respectively, to account for the censoring of the TPI variable. Results are presented in Columns (e) through (h) of Table 7. As with the OLS estimations, we see patterns of statistical significance and signs of estimated coefficients that are largely unchanged from those presented in Table 5. Focusing on the coefficients on the party affiliation and liberal/conservative self-classification

5. Continuous TPI values equal to 0 were set equal to 0.0001 prior to the logistic transformation.

TABLE 7
Continuous Trade Policy Perceptions Index Estimations, OLS and Tobit Estimations

Dependent Variable	(a) TPI	(b) Restricted TPI	(c) TPI	(d) Restricted TPI	(e) TPI	(f) Restricted TPI	(g) TPI	(h) Restricted TPI
Republican	1.1094* (0.4659)	0.7625# (0.4467)			0.1403** (0.0411)	0.1139* (0.0548)		
Democrat	-0.0079 (0.5123)	-0.618 (0.6837)			0.019 (0.0463)	-0.0335 (0.062)		
Very conservative			0.8844* (0.438)	1.266# (0.7143)			0.1041* (0.0492)	0.1556* (0.0662)
Somewhat conservative			0.7282# (0.4051)	1.2665* (0.6337)			0.1097* (0.0435)	0.161** (0.057)
Somewhat liberal			-0.3904 (0.688)	-1.282 ⁰ (0.137)			-0.0157 (0.0587)	-0.0861 (0.0785)
Very liberal			-0.0444 (0.9181)	-0.656 (1.2001)			0.01 (0.0764)	-0.0496 (0.1034)
Age			-0.0072 (0.0126)	-0.0298# (0.0178)	-0.0009 (0.0011)	-0.0025# (0.0015)	-0.0008 (0.0011)	-0.0029# (0.0015)
Annual income per adult (in household; \$1,000s)			0.0172 ⁰ (0.14)	0.02# (0.0113)	0.0009 (0.0008)	0.0018# (0.001)	0.0012 ⁰ (0.128)	0.0022* (0.001)
Average weekly earnings (in county of residence)			0.0026* (0.0012)	0.0029# (0.0016)	0.0003* (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0001)	0.0003* (0.0001)
African American	0.4334 (0.529)	0.8543 (0.6761)	0.15 (0.4948)	0.5591 (0.6125)	-0.0171 (0.0514)	0.0079 (0.0687)	-0.0455 (0.0488)	-0.02 (0.0643)
Asian	3.097 (2.2811)	0.1243 (0.7784)	3.5057# (2.1026)	1.2236 (0.8565)	0.2785 (0.2612)	0.0641 (0.2991)	0.3283 (0.2639)	0.1719 (0.2956)
Hispanic	2.4181* (0.9513)	2.9304# (1.6173)	2.167* (0.9714)	2.5403 ⁰ (0.133)	0.2941* (0.1439)	0.3273# (0.1948)	0.2645# (0.1447)	0.2717 (0.192)
Female				(1.6878)				
High school dropout	-0.1308 (0.3912)	-0.4759 (0.5289)	-0.0712 (0.39)	-0.5203 (0.5233)	-0.0209 (0.0351)	-0.0536 (0.0475)	-0.0112 (0.0347)	-0.0553 (0.0462)
High school graduate	-0.594 (0.8377)	-0.1094 (0.8602)	-0.5692 (0.8679)	-0.2041 (0.8362)	-0.1061 (0.0804)	-0.0505 (0.1338)	-0.0971 (0.0819)	-0.0508 (0.1338)
Some college	-1.5138* (0.647)	-2.462** (0.8092)	-1.4564* (0.6589)	-2.5913** (0.8087)	-0.1798** (0.0563)	-0.2523** (0.072)	-0.1718** (0.0566)	-0.2684** (0.0711)
College (4-yr) graduate	-1.523* (0.6107)	-2.2992** (0.7708)	-1.5642* (0.6175)	-2.487** (0.759)	-0.1696** (0.0529)	-0.2385** (0.0672)	-0.1736** (0.0533)	-0.2574** (0.0669)
Homeowner	-0.8877 (0.6205)	-1.028 (0.7922)	-0.8343 (0.6257)	-1.2108 ⁰ (0.13)	-0.0845 ⁰ (0.109)	-0.0973 (0.0662)	-0.0784 ⁰ (0.136)	-0.1142# (0.0658)
Constant	-0.2966 (0.4783)	-0.5613 (0.6856)	-0.2508 (0.4926)	-0.7125 (0.685)	-0.0702 ⁰ (0.121)	-0.0959 (0.0614)	-0.0621 (0.0454)	-0.1068# (0.0611)
SE (ancillary parameter)	-1.4508 (1.2351)	-0.5743 (1.8122)	-1.4907 (1.2935)	-0.4683 (1.8668)	0.4128** (0.108)	0.4922** (0.0198)	0.3983** (0.1121)	0.4973** (0.1523)
N	650	354	650	354	650	354	650	354
Adjusted R ²	0.022	0.048	0.017	0.064				
F-statistic	2.47**	3.79**	2.14**	3.87**				
Pseudo R ²					0.0505	0.0853	0.064	0.1043
Likelihood ratio statistic					48.58**	45.22**	49.37**	55.28**
Log-likelihood statistic					-456.58	-242.49	-360.96	-237.46

Note: See Table 5 notes.

variables, we find no change in the incidence of significance or the coefficient signs. As before, Republican survey respondents are more likely to hold favorable views of trade relative to Democrats and independents. Similarly, respondents who report being either very conservative or somewhat conservative are significantly more likely to hold pro-trade views compared to centrists and liberals. We take these findings to imply the robustness of our results to changes in econometric specification and to indicate that our results are not dependent on the binary reclassification of the continuous TPI variable.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

We have examined determinants of trade preferences. Confirming prior research, we find that the influence of education on preferences is nonlinear. High school graduates and individuals who have completed some college coursework are more likely to oppose trade; however, high school dropouts appear to only hold antitrade views on job-related issues. Opposition is even more diffuse among college graduates. Higher income is associated with support for trade. Homeowners appear sensitive to potentially detrimental trade-related domestic labor market outcomes. Higher average weekly earnings in the respondent's county of residence are associated with support for trade, possibly indicating a community wealth or an asset effect. Consideration of political party affiliation and conservative/liberal classification reveals that both have significant influences on individuals' trade preferences. Republicans are estimated to be, on average, 13.7%–15.1% more likely to favor trade compared to independents and Democrats. Although, on particular issues, distinctions are reported between respondents who are very conservative and those who are somewhat conservative, the typical conservative is 14.8%–21% more likely than centrists and liberals to support trade.

While our findings support and extend the associated literature, we acknowledge that our survey sample is restricted to the state of Georgia, which has a unique demographic, economic, and political profile. This raises concerns regarding the ability to make general statements based on our findings. It is noteworthy that rapid growth in Georgia's population over the past 15 yr or so has resulted in

Georgia now being home to many people who were raised outside of the South. The state's population grew 26% between 1990 and 2000, and the majority of that growth can be accounted for by people migrating to Georgia from other U.S. states—13% from the Northeast, 12% from the Midwest, and 10% from the West; 45% came from other southern states and the remainder from other countries (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2007). While we cannot determine whether this makes Georgians any more or less favorable to free trade, it may make them more like the rest of the United States. This being said, party affiliation and liberal/conservative classification may correspond with loyalty, or opposition, to the political party in power. For example, if presidents are more likely to favor trade liberalization than is Congress, regardless of party and ideology, survey respondents who identify themselves as conservatives and/or Republicans may likely report pro-trade views given that the Bush administration is currently in office but might have held less favorable views toward trade during the Clinton administration. This underscores the importance for future research that examines trade policy preferences using sample drawn during different time periods and from different geographic areas.

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