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Chapter

A Culture Shaped by Immigrants: Examining the Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy

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ABSTRACT

We examine U.S. immigration history both by recounting the related legislative history and by examining data on immigrant inflows and inflow shares during the period from 1820 through 2013. A descriptive analysis of the cultural differences between the U.S. and several cohorts of countries suggests that U.S. culture has been shaped by the pattern of immigrant arrivals. Broadly stated, American culture has evolved to be similar to those of European societies (predominantly, countries in Northern and Western Europe) and to largely be dissimilar to the cultures of other regions. Following the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act in 1968, the primary source regions of U.S. immigrant arrivals shifted to Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, and (to a lesser degree) Africa. We find some evidence that the U.S. has become more similar to the cultures of the recent arrivals' source countries. Our econometric analysis tests for structural breaks in the level of the immigrant inflow and inflow share series. The results support our general findings. We find clear evidence of significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and in the immigrant inflow share series. The detected structural breaks correspond with key pieces of legislation that have significantly influenced U.S. immigration policy.

Keywords: Cultural Distance, Generalized Least Squares, Hart-Celler Act, Immigration.

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INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an exploration of sorts. The cultural evolution of the United States is intricately tied to its immigration history, a history that has been influenced by the country's immigration policies. Prior to 1790, during the Colonial Era and the first years following independence, an "open door" policy was largely maintained. From 1790 until 1875, the U.S. followed a *de facto* immigration policy linked to the laws that governed naturalization. Specifically, no laws restricted the arrival of immigrants or dictated the composition of inflows, but immigration to the U.S. was shaped by restrictions on who could become a citizen. This provided incentives for immigration from Northern and Western Europe while serving to discourage migration from other regions. Beginning in 1875, *de jure* federal legislation/policies shaped immigration to the U.S. The policies afforded entry preference to immigrants from Europe and directly limited or, in some cases, indirectly discouraged immigration from many other locales. This persisted, largely, until the Hart-Celler Act was enacted in 1968. The Act led to a marked increase in the annual immigrant inflow as well as a corresponding shift in the primary source regions for U.S. immigrant arrivals.

To a large degree, the current composition of American society, as indicated by self-reported ancestries, mirrors the historic immigrant inflows of the country.¹ From 1840 through 1889, 14.3 million immigrants arrived to the United States. Europe was the primary source region of these arrivals, accounting for 12.8 million immigrants (89.1% of the total inflow). More specifically, 11.7 million of the arrivals were from Northern and Western European countries with Germany (29.9% of the total inflow), Ireland (22.4%), and the United Kingdom (18.1%) collectively accounting for 10.1 million arrivals. Between 1890 and 1919, another 18.2 million immigrants arrived. Of the arrivals during this period, 88.4 percent were from Europe and another 4.6 percent were from Canada. Unlike earlier inflows, however, the primary source regions were Southern and Eastern Europe with Italy (20.6%), Austria-Hungary (20.2%), and Russia and Poland (17.4%) accounting for 10.6 million of the total inflow. Even so, as of 1919, the U.S. population was predominantly European or of European descent.

Following several decades of diminished immigrant inflows, U.S. immigration policy changed when the Hart-Celler Act (i.e., the Immigration Act of 1965) was enacted. The Act abolished the biased National Origins Formula that had been in place since passage of the Emergency Quota Act in 1921 and established a preference system based on family reunification, filling labor market vacancies, and admission of refugees and asylum-seekers. When the Hart-Celler Act was implemented, a resulting shift occurred in the primary source regions of U.S. immigrants. No longer was Europe the primary source region. It had been replaced by Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and, to a lesser extent, Africa. Even so, over the 2009-2013 period, the American Community Study (ACS) found that 58 percent of the U.S.'s residents self-identified as being of European ancestry (ACS, 2015).

During the past 50 years, a total of 58.5 million immigrants entered the United States. Illustrative of the pronounced shift in source regions, Europe and Canada account for only 8.1 million of the total immigrant inflow (13.8%). The vast majority of these more recent

¹ The statistics presented in this section, unless otherwise noted, are calculated from data presented in Pew Research Center (2015).

immigrant arrivals have come from Latin America (50.8%) or Southern and Eastern Asia (25.2%). The primary source countries have been Mexico (with 27.8% of the total inflow), China (5.4%), and India (4.6%). These three countries have collectively accounted for 22.2 million of the total immigrant arrivals.

Generally speaking, this chapter details our exploration of the history of immigration to the United States. We look at the related legislative history and at data on immigrant inflows for the period from 1820-2013. We augment our review of immigration policy with a descriptive analysis of the cultural differences between the U.S. and several cohorts of countries. The aim is to determine whether U.S. immigration policy and the corresponding level of immigrant inflows and composition of inflows by country/region have influenced American culture. We support our descriptive analysis with an econometric analysis of immigrant inflows where we test for structural breaks in the level of immigrant inflows and in the composition of the inflow share series.

We find that U.S. immigration policy has had a marked influence on immigrant arrivals both in terms of the number of arrivals and their source countries/regions. Further, the immigrant arrivals have influenced American culture such that the U.S. was, in the late 1960s, more culturally-similar to Europe (particularly Northern and Western European countries), Canada, and Australia and New Zealand and dissimilar to the cultures of Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa. However, there is some evidence that the shift in source countries and regions of U.S. immigrant arrivals that followed the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act has moved the culture of the U.S. closer to the cultures of recent immigrant arrivals' source countries and, thus, somewhat away from what may be described as more traditional source countries. Supporting these findings, our econometric analysis provides clear evidence of significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and the immigrant inflow share series that correspond with key pieces of legislation that has governed U.S. immigration policy.

In the next section, we review U.S. immigration policy. This is followed by the introduction of two composite measures of cross-societal cultural differences (i.e., cultural distance) and a descriptive examination of the measures. We then present the findings from an econometric analysis that tests for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow and immigrant inflow share series before concluding.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF U.S. IMMIGRATION HISTORY

From the founding of the Virginia Colony at Jamestown in 1607 through the passage of the Page Act in 1875, no laws restricted the inflow of individuals to what is now the United States. Instead, a quasi-open door policy existed. Even though there were no restrictions on who may enter the country, restrictions did limit who could become a citizen. This likely influenced both the level of immigrant inflows during the period and the composition of inflows in terms of source countries and regions. More specifically, the Naturalization Act of 1790 established a uniform citizenship process. It allowed “any alien, being a free white person” and “of good moral character” who had lived in the country for two or more years to become a U.S. citizen (Jagers, et al., 2013). The Naturalization Act of 1795 increased the

residency requirement to five years, and the Naturalization Act of 1798 extended the required residency period further to 14 years (Orgad, 2011).²

The combination of the U.S. having been a British colony and the stipulation that citizenship was only attainable for white residents in all likelihood encouraged emigration from Northern and Western European countries while discouraging emigration from other locales. Evidence supporting this assertion is found in the 1790 U.S. census. Nearly two-thirds (66.2%) of the population was either English or of English descent.³ Another 14.2 percent of the population was Scotch (5.6%), German (4.5%), Dutch (2.0%), Irish (1.6%), French (0.5%), or descendants of immigrants from these countries. Yet another 0.27 percent of the population was classified as white but of unknown origin. Slaves, primarily from West Africa, constituted 17.8 percent of the population, and free non-whites accounted for 1.3 percent of the population. Native Americans (i.e., the indigenous peoples) comprised only 0.19 percent of the population.

More than 80 percent of the total U.S. population in 1790, and 97.8 percent of the country's free population, was either an immigrant from Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands, or France or was a descendant of someone from these countries. This allowed for a massive cultural transfer from Northern and Western European countries to the American colonies and, thus, to the U.S. (U.S. Census Bureau, 1909). This cultural transfer was part of the Columbian Exchange which included biological exchange (e.g., animals, plants, technology, diseases, etc.) between the New and Old Worlds (Crosby, 1972).

The profoundly unequal "exchange" favored the Europeans and was detrimental to the indigenous peoples of the Americas. The arrival of the Spanish, the French, and the British led to the decimation of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. Dutch, Swedish, and even Russian immigrants (primarily along the Pacific Coast) also contributed to the demise of the Native Americans. By 1790, only a few thousand Native Americans lived east of the Alleghany Mountains and only in Pennsylvania and New York, where reservations had been established, and beyond the western frontier settlements were the numbers of Native Americans sufficient for the maintenance of tribal relations and the occupation of considerable territory (U.S. Census Bureau, 1909).

Naturalization Laws and *De Facto* Federal Immigration Policy

Prior to the passage of the Steerage Act in 1819 no records were kept of the number of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. or the immigrants' countries of origin. The Steerage Act, however, required shipmasters to provide manifests with counts of all immigrants transported. These numbers were tracked by the Secretary of State and reported to the Congress (Koven and Götzke, 2010). Another quarter-century would pass until additional legislation governing immigration was enacted. The Passenger Law of 1847 and the Passenger Law of 1855 regulated the transport of immigrants to the United States. For example, the 1855 law required no more than one passenger for every two tons of the vessel, a minimum amount of deck space (16 feet) per passenger, and that ships were subject to inspection upon arrival at U.S. ports and captains would be fined for any violations (Hirota, 2013). While these laws

² In 1802, the administration of President Thomas Jefferson revised the Naturalization Act of 1798 such that the residency requirement was reduced to five years.

³ The source for all population shares presented in this paragraph is the U.S. Census Bureau (1909).

provided for a safer and more comfortable passage to the U.S., they were not aimed at limiting the number of arrivals, so the laws did little to affect the source country composition of immigrant inflows. In fact, Table 1 shows that 90 percent of the 9,985,008 immigrants that entered the U.S. between 1820 and 1881 were from European countries. The vast majority (87.3%) of these immigrants were from Northern Europe (primarily, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavia) or Western Europe (Germany).

<Insert Table 1 about here>

The first laws enacted with the goal of restricting immigration to the U.S. were passed by the California state legislature. In 1850 and in 1852, the legislature imposed taxes on foreign miners. The 1850 law required foreign miners to pay a monthly tax of \$20; however, the law proved so unpopular that it was repealed in 1851 and replaced in 1852 by a monthly tax of \$4 (OAC, 2016). A subsequent piece of legislation that was also passed by the California legislature was known as the “Anti-coolie law”. The formal title of this law is “An Act to Protect Free White Labor against Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor and to Discourage the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California” (Haymond, et al., 1873). The Act imposed a \$2.50 tax on anyone of Chinese origin who applied for a mining and/or business license (Lee, 2015a). By raising the cost of working in the U.S. and by discriminating in terms of which individuals were subject to the taxes, the legislature was seeking to both limit the number of immigrant arrivals, especially those arriving from China, and alter the composition of the foreign-born population.

Efforts to limit immigration at the Federal level lagged behind those of the State of California and were, at times, contrary to the discriminatory laws enacted in California. For example, as a matter of necessity, due to shortages caused by the Civil War, the Immigration Act of 1864 encouraged the immigration of foreign laborers (Gold, 2012). The Naturalization Act of 1870 extended the right to citizenship to blacks and Native Americans; however, Asians (except Filipinos) remained ineligible for U.S. citizenship (Mink, 1998).

Restricting Immigration: *De Jure* Federal Immigration Policy

The Page Act of 1875 was the first piece of Federal legislation that explicitly restricted immigration to the United States. The Page Act banned “undesirable” individuals from entry to the U.S. What was considered “undesirable” included Asian women who might engage in prostitution, any Asian who may be used as forced labor once in the U.S., and anyone (Asian or otherwise) who was a convict in their home country (Miller, 2012). A similar piece of legislation, the Immigration Act of 1891, barred the entry of individuals who suffered from a dangerous contagious disease, had been convicted in their home country of a crime involving moral turpitude, or were polygamists (Richardson, 1962).

Between 1876 and 1881, 1,754,826 immigrants entered the U.S.⁴ Similar to the earlier portion of the century, the majority (76.4%) of these immigrants was from European countries. Likewise, Northern and Western Europe were again the primary source regions, accounting for 87.8 percent of the immigrants from Europe. Figure 1 illustrates the time paths of immigrant inflows from Africa, the Americas (excluding Canada), Asia, and Europe,

⁴ The source for all values presented in this paragraph is the U.S. Census Bureau (1909).

Canada, and Oceania. The sub-regions and countries that were the main sources for U.S. immigrant arrivals were Scandinavia (31.4% of the total inflow from Europe), Ireland (19.4%), Germany (16%), the United Kingdom (15.3%), and other countries in Northwestern Europe (5.8%). Of the 578,504 non-European immigrant arrivals to the U.S. during this period, by far the most common source country was Canada which accounted for 326,714 (56.5%) of the non-European inflow. An additional 69,663 immigrants arrived from China (12% of the non-European inflow) which was similar to the number of arrivals from Italy (67,987).

<Insert Figure 1 about here>

As the California Gold Rush wound down in the mid-1850s and the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, there was a corresponding decrease in the demand for foreign labor. Anti-Chinese sentiment that had mostly been limited to California during the 1850s and 1860s grew and extended to other locales. Instability of the U.S. economy following the close of the Civil War, coupled with high unemployment and a sluggish labor market during the Long Depression (1873-1879), heightened anti-Chinese sentiment as many in the U.S. viewed the Chinese laborers as competition for jobs. During the period, anti-Chinese riots and violence occurred in more than 30 cities (Lee, 2015b). The Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885 prohibited the entry of contract labor to the U.S., with the exceptions of immigrants who were to perform domestic services and those who were considered skilled workmen that were needed to establish new trades and/or industries in the United States (DeLaet, 2000). Effectively, the Alien Contract Labor Law afforded considerable protection to domestic labor.

The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) was the second federal law that restricted immigration to the U.S. and it was the first to do so in a significant way. The Act halted Chinese migration to the U.S. for a period of ten years and prohibited Chinese residents of the U.S. from becoming citizens (Chang, 2004). In 1892, the Geary Act extended the ban for an additional decade. The Geary Act also required all Chinese already living in the U.S. to carry permits (Gold, 2012). As the expiration of the Geary Act neared, in 1902 the Scott Act was passed which effectively renewed the Chinese Exclusion Act, this time making the ban on Chinese immigration permanent. Coinciding with the Chinese Exclusion Act, the Immigration Act of 1882 sought to further restrict immigrant inflows by imposing a \$0.50 arrival tax on all immigrants and, in the same vein as the Page Act of 1875, by making some classifications of immigrants ineligible for citizenship (i.e., those deemed to be “lunatics” or who were likely to become public charges) (Wexler, 2009). Similarly, following the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901 by a Polish anarchist, the Anarchist Exclusion Act, which prohibited the entry of anyone judged to be an anarchist or political extremist, was passed by Congress in 1903 (Bantman and Altena, 2015).

The decades following the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act saw many additional pieces of legislation limit and/or discourage migration to the U.S. Generally, these laws served to limit immigration unevenly with Northern and Western European countries continuing to receive preferential treatment. For example, the Naturalization Act of 1906 standardized the process for naturalization and made knowledge of the English language a prerequisite for citizenship (Ovando, 2003). A year later, an informal agreement (known as the “Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907”) was struck between the U.S. and Japan wherein the

U.S. government agreed to work to reduce discrimination against Japanese Americans and to not explicitly restrict migration from Japan if the Japanese government would voluntarily restrict migration to the U.S. (Uba, 2003).

Also in 1907, the Congress established the Dillingham Commission to examine the effects of immigration on the United States. After four years of study, the Commission concluded that migration from Southern European and Eastern European countries posed a risk to American society and its culture (King, 2002). Accordingly, the Commission recommended stark reductions in inflows from these regions. Also in 1907, the Expatriation Act declared that any American woman who married a foreign national would lose her citizenship (Bredbenner, 1998). This prohibition was partially repealed by the Cable Act of 1922; however, it remained that any American woman who married an Asian would lose her citizenship (Bredbenner, 1998). In 1913, the California legislature passed the Alien Land Law which dictated that individuals who are ineligible for citizenship cannot own property in the state (Bailey, 1932). Other states used this law as a model for similar anti-Asian laws.

At the close of World War I, due to a heightened sense of nationalism and/or a perceived need for economic self-sufficiency, the Congress overrode a presidential veto to pass the Immigration Act of 1917. The Act created the “Asiatic Barred Zone”, effectively banning all migration to the U.S. from Asia, with the exceptions of Japan and the Philippines. Of course, immigration from Japan was already limited by the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907 and, at the time, the Philippines was a protectorate of the U.S. Even with the existing restrictions on the composition of immigrant inflows, efforts continued throughout the inter-war period to further limit the amount of immigration to the U.S.

Collectively, the legislative restrictions imposed on immigration to the U.S. achieved the goal of limiting non-European migration. Revisiting Table 1, we find that immigration from Asia increased from the previous period but also that immigration from China to the U.S. decreased to zero after 1882. We also see that 89.5 percent of the 22,986,644 immigrant arrivals to the U.S. during the 1882-1920 period were from Europe.⁵ However, differing from inflows during earlier periods, Northern and Western Europe no longer were the primary source regions. Only 35.8 percent of the total immigrant inflow came from Northern (25.2%) or Western (10.6%) Europe. Instead, Southern (20.3%) and Eastern (33.2%) Europe emerged to account for 53.5 percent of the total inflow. Italy and Poland largely accounted for the high inflow shares of these sub-regions.

The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 limited the annual immigrant inflow from any country to three percent of the 1910 U.S. population from that country (Hatton and Williamson, 2005). Only three years later, the Immigration Act of 1924 further limited annual migration from European nations to two percent or less of the number of people from a given country who lived in the U.S. in 1890 (Hatton and Williamson, 2005). By lowering the limit to two percent and moving the reference date to 1890, the Act greatly reduced immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe.

Further restricting migration from Asia, the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924 extended the ban on immigration from Asia to include foreign-born wives and children of American citizens of Chinese ancestry (Green and Stabler, 2015). This followed two landmark Supreme Court cases: *Ozawa vs. the United States* in 1922 and *the United States vs. Bhaghat Singh*

Thind in 1923. In the Ozawa case, the Court ruled that Takao Ozawa, who was of Japanese origin, could not become a U.S. citizen as he was not white (Odo, 2002). Similarly, in the Thind case, the Court ruled that Indians from the Asian subcontinent could not become U.S. citizens as they are not white (Odo, 2002). In 1929, the National Origins Formula completely barred Asian immigration and instituted a quota system that capped the total annual inflow of immigrants to the U.S. at 150,000 with 85 percent of the total inflow assigned to Northern and Western European countries (Wepman, 2008). There were, however, no limits placed on migration to the U.S. from countries in the western hemisphere. Five years later, in 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Act promised independence to the Philippines (as of July 4, 1946) but stripped Filipinos of U.S. citizenship (Baum and Harris, 2009). Finally, in 1940, the Alien Registration Act required that all aliens over the age of 14 in the U.S. be fingerprinted and registered (Camayd-Freixas, 2013).

A Shift in U.S. Immigration Policy

Passage of the Magnuson Act in 1943 marked the beginning of a shift in U.S. immigration policy from the increasingly restrictive stance that was adopted beginning in 1875 towards a more liberal, less discriminating policy. Although the Magnuson Act repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the legislative change was largely symbolic since Chinese migration to the U.S. remained limited to 105 immigrants per year by the National Origins Formula (Wong, 2005). Additional relatively minor, yet meaningful changes followed the end of World War II. For example, the War Brides Act of 1945, the Alien Fiancées and Fiancés Act of 1946, and the Alien Spouses and Children Act of 1950 established procedures for the immigration of foreign-born spouses, fiancées or fiancés, and children of U.S. armed forces personnel (Boyd, 1971; Levchenko and Solheim, 2013; and Ziegler-McPherson, 2012). Similarly, the 1946 Chinese War Brides Act exempted Chinese wives of American citizens from the quota, and the Luce-Celler Act of 1946 permitted immigration from the Philippines and India and granted naturalization rights to Filipino-Americans and to Indian-Americans, who had been previously excluded. However, similar to the repeal of the Magnuson Act, the Luce-Celler Act was a largely symbolic gesture as immigration from both India and the Philippines was restricted by annual quotas of only 100 individuals (Ziegler-McPherson, 2012). The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 was enacted as a short-term measure to allow up to 205,000 refugees to enter the United States. Priority was given to refugees from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose entry was counted against the established quota (Schindlmayr, 2003).⁵ In 1953, the Refugee Relief Act revised the 1948 Act to allow for an additional 200,000 refugee admissions each year (Gordon, 1980).

Similar to the Immigration Act of 1917, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952) was passed by Congress even though it had been vetoed by the president. The McCarran-Walter Act was somewhat of a watershed moment in U.S. immigration history. The Act eliminated race as a barrier to immigration and citizenship, allowed immediate relatives of U.S. citizens to enter without numerical

⁵ It is important to note that while the importation of slaves was officially banned in 1808 there was no discernable increase in migration from Africa to the U.S. until the mid- to late-20th century (U.S. Census Bureau, 1909 and 1975).

⁶ Because the number of refugee arrivals exceeded the annual quota limits, the practice of “quota mortgaging” (i.e., borrowing from future years’ quota limits to accommodate more arrivals in the current year) became common.

restriction, and revised the quota allocations established by the National Origins Formula (Keely, 1971). Even so, the quota limits remained biased in favor of immigrants from Northern and Western Europe. For example, Japan's quota was increased to only 185 immigrants each year, China's quota remained at 105 arrivals per year, and the annual limit was set at 100 for all other Asian countries (Keely, 1971). In contrast, the Act maintained the quota for Northern and Western European countries at 85 percent of each year's total immigrant inflow, with the total annual immigrant inflow set equal to one-sixth of one percent of the U.S. population (Keely, 1971). Additionally, restrictions on immigrants from British colonies were tightened while immigrants who married American women were added to those exempt from quotas (Keely, 1971).

Given the strict limits placed on the level of immigrant inflows, only 6,305,238 immigrants entered the U.S. during the 1921-1951 period (see Table 1). The annual average inflow of 203,395 immigrants was markedly smaller than the average inflow of 589,401 immigrants witnessed during the 1882-1920 period and much closer to the average annual inflow of 161,049 immigrants observed from 1820 through 1881. The composition of immigrant inflows, in terms of source countries and regions, was also affected by the legislation enacted during this period. The share of the total inflow that was from Europe decreased to 61 percent, but the share of the total inflow accounted for by Northern and Western Europe (34.6%) was only slightly lower than in the preceding period. To the contrary, the inflow from Southern and Eastern Europe constituted only 26.3 percent of the total inflow, which represents a considerable decrease from the 53.5 percent value observed during the 1882-1920 period. As the share of immigrants from Europe declined, we see an increase in the immigrant share from 2.2 percent to 12.1 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean that is primarily due to a near-threefold increase in migration from Mexico. We also see a near-doubling of the immigrant share value for Asia (from 2.8% to 5.3%).

Following the changes made during World War II and in the decade following the war, the Hart-Celler Act (also known as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965) led to considerable changes in both the level of immigrant inflows to the U.S. and in the source countries of the immigrant arrivals. When enacted in 1968, the 1965 Act abolished the quota system that had been in effect since the 1920s and changed the basis for entry to a) promotion of family reunification, b) filling of labor market vacancies (i.e., critical skills/artistic excellence), and c) accommodating refugees and asylum-seekers (Lie, 1995). The Hart-Celler Act led to a pronounced increase in the number of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and a shift in the primary source countries/regions of immigrant arrivals from Europe to Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa to a lesser extent. The Act also established an annual limit of 290,000 immigrant arrivals that was split as 120,000 immigrants from the western hemisphere and 170,000 immigrants from the eastern hemisphere (Lie, 1995). The law was revised in 1978 to allow for a total of 290,000 immigrant arrivals annually regardless of hemisphere, and two years after that the 1980 Refugee Act removed refugees as a preference category and the annual ceiling was decreased to 270,000 immigrants (Caroli, 1983).

The other significant legislative changes since the passage of the Hart-Celler Act are the Simpson-Mazzoli Act (also known as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986) and the Immigration Act of 1990. The Simpson-Mazzoli Act amended the Hart-Celler Act to provide amnesty for many undocumented immigrants and established penalties for employers who hired undocumented immigrants (Fuchs, 1990). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 increased the annual number of immigrant arrivals to 700,000 during the years 1992-

1994 and to 675,000 per year thereafter. It also modified the preference system adopted by the Hart-Celler Act to include family-based immigration visa and five types of employment-based visas (categorized by occupation), and it created a diversity visa program which sought to admit immigrants from traditionally “low admittance” countries or those countries that were underrepresented in the U.S. population (Greenwood and Ziel, 1997).

Other legislative changes since 1968 have largely been minor and several pieces of legislation have focused on members of the armed forces. For example, the Armed Forces Naturalization Act of 1968, the Armed Forces Immigration Adjustment Act of 1991, the 2000 Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act, and the 2000 Bring Them Home Alive Act. Additional legislation has focused on policies governing the entry of refugees: the Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 and the 1982 Amerasian Immigration Act. Separate legislation focused on labor demand for particular types of workers. Specifically, a 1989 bill granted permanent resident status to non-immigrant registered nurses who had lived in U.S. for at least three years provided that they met established certification standards.

During the most recent two decades, even as many have asserted that a policy change is needed, very few legislative changes have occurred. The most significant change may be the USA Patriot Act of 2001 which expanded the scope of aliens ineligible for admission to the U.S. or that were deportable due to terrorist activities to include any alien who a) is a representative of a political, social, or similar group whose political endorsement of terrorist acts undermines U.S. antiterrorist efforts; b) has used a position of prominence to endorse terrorist activity or to persuade others to support such activity in a way that undermines U.S. antiterrorist efforts; or c) has been associated with a terrorist organization and intends to engage in threatening activities while in the U.S. (Sinnar, 2003).

The cumulative effect of the Hart-Celler Act and subsequent related legislation has been significant changes in the level of immigrant inflows and in the composition of immigrant arrivals in terms of the regions of origin. Looking to Table 1 yet again we see that the immigrant inflow was equal to 753,644 in the typical year during the period from 1968 through 2013. Perhaps more striking is that 44.2 percent of all U.S. immigrant arrivals during the period spanning 1820 through 2013 occurred during the most recent four and a half decades. For the first time, we see significant increases in the number of immigrants from Africa (i.e., 5.4% of the total inflow since 1968). We also observe a near-doubling of Asia’s immigrant share, from 18.2 percent during the 1952-1967 period to 35.4 percent since 1968. Likewise, we see the share of the total immigrant inflow from Latin America and the Caribbean more than doubled from 21.4 percent to 44.5 percent. As the shares for these regions have increased, we have witnessed a corresponding decrease in the immigrant share value for Europe from 44.1 percent during the 1952-1967 period to only 12.2 percent over the years 1968-2013.

Thus, from our brief review of U.S. immigration history we can see that a clear bias favoring immigration from European countries and, notably, Northern and Western European countries existed until the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act in 1968. During the past several decades, we have observed a considerable shift in the source countries and regions of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and a significant increase in the number of immigrants that enter the U.S. each year. Even so, column (f) of Table 1 indicates that the cumulative immigrant share for Europe over the 1820-2013 period is 50.5 percent. The next highest share is that of Latin America and the Caribbean (22.6%) with Asia (18.2%) slightly lower.

As noted at the beginning of this section, the settling and populating of the United States coincided, especially during the Colonial Era, with the Columbian Exchange. Along with the biological exchange that occurred between the Old and New Worlds, there was also a cultural exchange. We posit that this exchange was largely one-sided and dominated by an imprint of European cultures on the U.S. and its residents. The duration of the exchange, facilitated in part by a biased immigration policy that favored European migration to the U.S. and that limited, in direct and indirect ways, migration to the U.S. from many other regions, acted to reinforce the exchange and deepen the European cultural imprint. In short, given the shift in the composition of immigrant inflows to Asia, Latin American and the Caribbean, and to a lesser extent Africa, many recent immigrant arrivals to the U.S. have entered a country that is quite culturally-dissimilar from their countries of origin.

In the next section, we introduce composite measures of cultural distance and examine the cultural distance between the U.S. and immigrants' home countries. We follow this by estimating the determinants of migration to the U.S. and testing for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow and immigrant inflow share series that correspond with the enactment of four key pieces of legislation: a) the Chinese Exclusion Act, b) the Emergency Quota Act, c) the McCarren-Walter Act, and d) the Hart-Celler Act.

MEASURES OF CROSS-SOCIETAL CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Measuring Cross-societal Cultural Differences

Given the legislative history of U.S. immigration policy and the resulting influences on the levels of immigrant arrivals to the country and their composition in terms of source regions/countries, it seems reasonable to ask whether the culture of the U.S. is more similar to the cultures of our cohort of traditional source countries as compared to the non-traditional source country cohort. Similarly, the changes in the levels and primary source countries of immigrants to the U.S. since the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act begs the question of whether the U.S. has become, in recent decades, less similar to the traditional source country cohort and more similar to the non-traditional cohort.

To answer the first question, we estimate the cultural distance between the U.S. and all countries for which data are available during the 1967-1973 period and then conduct a series of t-tests of the difference in mean cultural distance values between the U.S. and those countries that fall within the traditional and the non-traditional source country cohorts. We also test whether the U.S. is significantly more (or less) similar to particular regions and country cohorts. Examining cultural distances for this particular period of time allows us to determine the relative cultural distances between the U.S. and the cohorts at just about the time when the Hart-Celler Act became effective. To address the second question, we repeat our calculations using a measure of cultural distance that is based on survey data collected during the early 1990s. While the use of cultural distance measures that are constructed using two separate data sources is less than ideal, the cultural dimensions of the two series that we use to estimate cultural distances are comparable.

Before performing our tests, we first introduce the two measures of cultural distance (i.e., cultural differences) and detail the methodology involved in the calculation of the cultural distance estimates.

The Hofstede Measure

The Hofstede measure of cultural distance was inspired by Geert Hofstede's tenure at IBM's personnel research department in 1967. Surveying the company's 117,000 employees, Hofstede developed cultural profiles for each of the top 40 employing countries, later expanding this even further. At the time, this cross-cultural database of survey questions and answers served as the largest of its kind, opening the door even further for quantifiable measures of cultural distance. Hofstede's measure initially included four dimensions of cultural distance. These dimensions measure what Hofstede describes as "anthropological problem areas" and provide insight to how different cultures approached each area. Over the following few decades, additional dimensions were added. As we are interested in quantifying the extents of cultural differences between the U.S. and various country groupings at/near the time when the Hart-Celler Act was enacted, we restrict our focus to Hofstede's initial four dimensions.

The first of the dimensions is the Power Distance Index (PDI).⁷ The PDI represents how well individuals within a society expect and accept unequal power structures within their society, both at familial and institutional levels. A higher score indicates higher proclivities toward accepted and unchallenged hierarchies. The second dimension is Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV), which analyzes the extent to which an individual identifies as being a member of a group. An individual with a high IDV score maintains only loose ties and associations with groups outside their immediate family. An individual with a low score thus places more importance and focus on maintaining relationships with broader collectives, such as extended families or those of similar beliefs. The third dimension is Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS). Masculinity is viewed as a preference for achievement, aggression, and material rewards for success. On the other hand, Femininity is seen as an embracement of modesty and concerns for life quality. Within societies that score high in Masculinity, it is seen that differences in gender roles are often very stark between men and women relative to societies with high scores in Femininity. Finally, the fourth dimension is the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). In this index, risk-loving and risk-averse behaviors are measured for individuals within each society. In Hofstede's words, it is "a society's tolerance for ambiguity," and those with higher scores tend to prefer more rigid institutions and laws as well as typically believing in a universal truth or morality.

Values for Hofstede's four initial dimensions are available for the U.S. and 100 countries.⁸ To calculate our measure of cultural distance, we follow the process used by Kogut and Singh (1988): $CD_{ij} = \sum_{k=1}^4 \left[\frac{(I_{ik} - I_{jk})^2}{V_k} \right] / 4$. Here, CD_{ij} is the estimated cultural distance between countries i and j (with the U.S. being country j), I is the index value for the k^{th} cultural dimension, and V is the variance of the index of the k^{th} cultural dimension. To illustrate, the estimated cultural distance between the U.S. and Japan is equal to 3.1096, which is near the average cultural distance value of 3.0723, while the U.S.-U.K. cultural distance is 0.0947 and the cultural distance between the U.S. and Russia is 4.8353.

⁷ The source for the descriptions of the four dimensions provided in this paragraph is Hofstede (1980).

⁸ The Hofstede dimension values of each country for which data are available are provided as Appendix A.

We begin with our first question: Is the culture of the U.S. more similar to the cultures of the traditional source country cohort as compared to the cultures of the non-traditional source country cohort? To answer this question, we first categorize the 100 countries for which the Hofstede cultural dimension values are available as belonging to the traditional source country cohort or to the non-traditional source country cohort. The countries that are categorized as part of the traditional source country include Australia, Canada, New Zealand and all countries located in Europe with the exceptions of former members of the USSR.⁹ Due to limited migration from these countries prior to World War II and the break in relations during the Cold War, this exclusion appears appropriate.¹⁰

The average cultural distances from the U.S. for the traditional source country cohort and the non-traditional source country cohort are 2.3715 and 3.3586, respectively. The t-test of the difference in mean values yields a test statistic of 3.10; thus, the difference in values is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and the answer to our first question is, as expected, that the culture of the U.S. at the time when the Hart-Celler Act was enacted was more similar to that of the typical member of the traditional source country cohort than it was to the typical member of the non-traditional country cohort. In other words, the culture of the United States was more like the cultures of the countries that had been afforded entry preference to the U.S. and less like the cultures of those countries that traditionally were not among the primary source countries for U.S. immigrant arrivals.

Given that for many years the primary source countries for immigrant arrivals to the U.S. were from Northern and Western Europe, we also perform our t-test of the difference in mean cultural distance values between the U.S. and Northern and Eastern European countries as compared to the distance between the U.S. and all other countries for which data are available. We find that the average cultural distance from the U.S. for the countries located in Northern or Western Europe was equal to 1.573, while the average cultural distance for the remaining countries was equal to 3.2964. The t-test of the difference in mean values yields a test statistic of 6.16; thus, again the difference in values is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). At the end of the 1960s, the culture of the U.S. was more like the cultures of the primary source countries, which had received what may be described as generous entry preference to the U.S., as compared to the typical culture of the other countries for which data are available.

U.S. immigration policy heavily influenced the source countries of immigration inflows and thus the ethnic and cultural composition of the U.S. both classically and contemporarily. As policy was often created and maintained to attract immigrants from preferred regions, U.S. culture shifted toward the cultures of those source countries. Several purposeful measures were enacted to ensure U.S. acculturation threats from non-preferred countries were avoided. A large part of this was a selective immigration policy, both directly with the use of racial quotas and immigration restrictions and indirectly through legislation dictating U.S. naturalization processes. However, a second component utilized to combat the ‘culture threat’ of non-preferred source countries were laws that limited their ability to thrive or influence. One example that was discussed earlier is the California laws that were created to target

⁹ Countries are identified as being located in Eastern, Northern, Southern, or Western Europe by the superscripts “EE”, “NE”, “SE”, and “WE”, respectively.

¹⁰ As a check of sorts, a t-test of the differences in mean values was conducted with the former USSR members (identified in Appendix A with a superscript asterisk after the country’s name) included in the traditional cohort. The resulting test statistic was equal to 3.28, indicating a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.01$) in the mean values of the cultural distance series.

Chinese laborers in the mid-to-late 19th Century. The legislation levied taxes, restricted travel and work opportunities, and added additional barriers to starting small businesses. In the same year that Congress tasked the Dillingham Commission (1907) to research the threat of immigrant influence from Eastern and Southern Europe, the Expatriation Act was passed, which stripped citizenship from U.S. women who married those of Asian-descent. In a few words, immigration and naturalization policies were used jointly to limit the influence of non-preferred immigrants on U.S. culture, which as a result led the U.S. to develop more culturally-similar to Northern and Western Europe.

As noted, prior to the Hart-Celler Act (1965) which had abolished many of the U.S.'s racial immigration quotas, U.S. immigration was largely from Northern and Western Europe. Thus, we expect the U.S. to have low cultural distance (or to be more culturally-similar) with these traditional source regions. Using the Hofstede measure, we find this to be true. While cultures do change over time, the change is often gradual. It can be safely assumed then that the cultural distance between countries has stayed relatively constant over the past few decades. As a result, the U.S. cultural values may still reflect those of its primary source countries from before the recent policy shift in the 1960s.

When we look at the specific source countries of Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Canada we see only minor discrepancies when compared to the United States. Of Hofstede's metrics, the most homogenous is the Power Distance Index, where nearly all countries have values between 30 and 40 (with the exception of Ireland at 28). As relatively stable and established democracies, the cultures of all six countries exhibit very similar views toward social hierarchy. The second metric, Individualism vs. Collectivism, is also very similar across these six western democracies, with each scoring relatively high. The U.S. ranks highest in this respect. By comparison, the Masculinity vs. Femininity dimension has great variance. For example, looking to Sweden we see a remarkably low score of 5. The other countries in the cohort rank between 50 and 70. Hofstede describes Sweden as a more feminine society that focuses more emphasis on quality of life and societal equity of resources. This is not unique to Sweden, but apparent within many Scandinavian countries. Denmark, for instance, scores a 16. In Norway, the MAS score is 8. While the U.S. as a whole reflects the "Masculinity" values of Western Europe and Canada, it is worth noting that Scandinavian immigration concentrated in particular regions of the U.S. such as Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota. A Hofstede measure specifically for the Midwestern U.S. may indicate a strong similarity to Scandinavian values. The Uncertainty Avoidance Index is more varied across these six countries, with Germany scoring much higher than the other five. This is to be expected; Eastern European countries typically showcase higher UAI scores signaling there is less tolerance for ambiguity. The U.S., a large recipient of historic German immigration, does score higher in this category. While not as risk-averse as Germany, the U.S. is not as risk-appreciative as the United Kingdom, Sweden, or Ireland. Conclusively, we find that the U.S. in the Hofstede measure is never very culturally distant from the cohort's consensus and very rarely strays far from the country group average.

The GLOBE Project

Our second question addresses whether the U.S. has become, in recent decades, less similar to the traditional source country cohort and more similar to the non-traditional cohort.

Ideally, the Hofstede cultural dimension values would have been updated in recent years and we would be able to make a direct comparison to the 1967-1973 data. Unfortunately, this is not possible. An alternative is to use a portion of the data collected from 1991 through 1994 as part of the GLOBE (Globe Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research) Project. The GLOBE Project was conceived in 1991 in an attempt to better measure cultural differences between transnational cohorts. The data collection involved the surveying of more than 17,000 middle managers in 951 organizations in 58 countries (House, 1994).

To generate cultural dimensions, the data collected by the GLOBE Project was used to generate nine “cultural competencies” which we will refer to as cultural dimensions. Of these nine dimensions, six are quite similar to the initial four Hofstede cultural dimensions. So similar in fact that Magnussen et al. (2008) consider the GLOBE Project to be an extension of Hofstede’s research.¹¹

Focusing on dimensions that are most similar to Hofstede’s initial four cultural dimensions, the first dimension is Assertiveness (ASSERT) which House et al. (2004) defines as “the degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in their relationships with others.” This dimension, along with the Gender Egalitarianism (GEND-EGL) dimension, which is described as “the degree to which a collective minimizes gender inequality” (House et al., 2004), are similar to Hofstede’s Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS) dimension.

A second Hofstede dimension for which there are related GLOBE dimensions is Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV). The corresponding GLOBE dimensions are Institutional Collectivism (INST-COL) and In-Group Collectivism (INGP-COL). Institutional Collectivism is defined as “the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action” (House et al., 2004). In-Group Collectivism is defined as “the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families” (House et al., 2004).

The remaining two GLOBE cultural dimensions that are related to the Hofstede dimensions are Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance. In fact, these two GLOBE and Hofstede dimensions are so closely related as to share the same names: Hofstede’s dimensions are referred to as the Power Distance Index (PDI) and the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI). The GLOBE dimension of Power Distance is a measure of “the degree to which members of a collective expect power to be distributed equally.” (House et al., 2004). By comparison, Hofstede’s PDI is defined as “the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2001). The GLOBE Uncertainty Avoidance dimension reflects “the extent to which a society, organization, or group relies on social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate the unpredictability of future events.” (House et al., 2004) Again, for the sake of comparison, the Hofstede UAI is defined as “a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.”

Addressing our second question, we follow the same steps as when we examined the Hofstede cultural dimensions. We first calculate the GLOBE measure of cultural distance

¹¹ The GLOBE Project differs from Hofstede in that it explores both practices (i.e., what is) and values (i.e., what survey respondents feel should be). We focus solely on cultural practices as we are seeking to produce a measure of the cultural differences that exist between societies.

following Kogut and Singh (1988).¹² Then we categorize the 51 countries for which the GLOBE Project cultural dimension values are available as belonging to the traditional source country cohort or to the non-traditional source country cohort. Countries that are categorized as part of the traditional source country cohort include Australia, Canada, New Zealand and all countries located in Europe with the exception of Russia.^{13,14} Comparing the average cultural distances from the U.S. for the traditional source country cohort (0.9362) and the non-traditional source country cohort (1.11083) produces a test statistic of 1.11; thus, the difference in mean values is not statistically significant from zero. This suggests that during the early 1990s the cultural distance between the U.S. and the typical member of the traditional source country cohort was not significantly different from the cultural distance between the U.S. and the typical non-traditional source country.

Before reaching the conclusion implied by our t-test, it is important to note several caveats. First, the comparison across time periods is not entirely valid as the country groups do not match perfectly. Second, due to the lack of a time-varying measure of cultural distance, the comparison involves using different data sets. Third, roughly a quarter-century had transpired between the Hofstede surveys (1967-1973) and surveys administered by the GLOBE Project (1991-1994) and, intuitively, that seems to be too short a period of time for marked changes in national cultures to occur. Thus, while we feel that data limitations render us unable to reach the firm conclusion implied by our test, we are willing to say that a) additional examination, using more and better data, is necessary to fully address this question, and b) it may be that due to the increase in immigrant inflows and the corresponding shifts in immigrant inflow shares, the culture of the U.S. has become somewhat more like that of the non-traditional source country cohort. Further, assuming that the composition of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. does not change greatly in future decades, the processes that led the culture of the U.S. to resemble that of the traditional source country cohort will lead the U.S. to become culturally-similar to the source countries of more recent (and future) immigrants and more dissimilar from the current cultures of European countries (especially those in Northern and Western Europe), Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

POLICY CHANGES, IMMIGRANT INFLOWS, AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Given the relationships posited in the previous sections, we undertake an econometric analysis to determine whether key changes in U.S. immigration policy correspond with significant changes in the level of immigrant inflows and/or the composition of inflows in terms of country/region of origin. Using annual data during the period from 1820 through 2009, we estimate the gravity model of migration to identify the determinants of immigrant inflows and of immigrant shares. After estimating a series of econometric specifications, we test for breaks in the immigrant inflows series and the immigrant share series following

¹² The GLOBE Project dimension values of each country for which data are available are provided as Appendix B.

¹³ Countries are identified in Appendix B as being located in Eastern, Northern, Southern, or Western Europe by the superscripts “EE”, “NE”, “SE”, and “WE”, respectively.

¹⁴ We again perform a t-test of the differences in mean values with Russia (as the lone former member of the USSR listed in Appendix B) included in the traditional cohort. The resulting test statistic was equal to 1.62, indicating a statistically significant difference ($p < 0.10$) in the mean values of the cultural distance series.

enactment of a) the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), b) the Emergency Quota Act (1921), c) the McCarran-Walter Act (1952), and d) the Hart-Celler Act (1968). More specifically, we test for breaks in the overall data, partitioning our subjects of analysis into cohorts of “traditional” (i.e., Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) and non-traditional source countries, geographic regions (e.g., Europe and Asia) and sub-regions (e.g., Northern Europe and Eastern Asia), and certain select countries (i.e., Canada, China, and Mexico).¹⁵ The presence of a break in the data series indicates that the policy change had a significant effect on the volume and/or composition of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and, thus, may have a pronounced influence on U.S. culture and, hence, the cultural distance between the U.S. and the immigrants’ home countries.

The gravity model of migration is a variation of the gravity model of international trade, which was initially developed by Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963a and 1963b), and Linnemann (1966).¹⁶ Prior applications of the gravity framework to migration flows include Lewer and van den Berg (2008), White and Yamasaki (2014), and White (2015). The general specifications of the model that we use are given as equation (1) and equation (2).

$$\begin{aligned} \ln Inflow_{ijt} = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \ln Inflow_{ijt-1} + \beta_2 \ln \frac{RGDPC_{jt}}{RGDPC_{it}} + \beta_3 \ln POP_{it} \\ & + \beta_4 \ln GDIST_{ij} + \beta_5 COMLANG_{ij} + \beta_6 CONTIG_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{Inflow_{ijt}}{\sum_{i=1}^N Inflow_{ijt}} = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \frac{Inflow_{ijt-1}}{\sum_{i=1}^N Inflow_{ijt-1}} + \beta_2 \ln \frac{RGDPC_{jt}}{RGDPC_{it}} + \beta_3 \ln POP_{it} \\ & + \beta_4 \ln GDIST_{ij} + \beta_5 COMLANG_{ij} + \beta_6 CONTIG_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

In equation (1), the dependent variable series is the natural logarithm of immigrant inflows from country i that arrived in country j (i.e., the U.S.) during year t ($\ln Inflow_{ijt}$). Estimation of this equation affords an understanding of the determinants of the level of immigrant inflows to the U.S. during our reference period. Equation (2) is identical to equation (1) except that the dependent variable series is changed to the share of total U.S. immigrant arrivals during year t that are from country j ($\frac{Inflow_{ijt}}{\sum_{i=1}^N Inflow_{ijt}}$) and the corresponding alteration of the first explanatory variable listed (i.e., the one-year lagged value of the respective dependent variable series).

The one-year lagged values of the dependent variable series are included in each regression specification to capture inertia in immigrant arrivals and shares. Accordingly, we anticipate that the corresponding coefficient estimates will be positive. As economic opportunity is a prime motivation to migrate, we include the natural logarithm of the ratio of

¹⁵ A listing of countries in the data set, categorized by region and sub-region is provided as Appendix C.

¹⁶ The theoretical foundations for the gravity model of international trade were established and refined by Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Deardorff (1995), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) among others.

U.S. to country i real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita values $\left(\ln \frac{RGDP_{jt}}{RGDP_{it}}\right)$ in our estimation equations.¹⁷ All else constant, a higher ratio – that is, a higher level of average income in the U.S. as compared to a given migrant’s source country – is expected to increase migration flows and inflow shares. As a measure of mass, we include the natural logarithm of the population of country i ($\ln POP_{it}$). Our expectation is that, all else constant, a larger population in country i corresponds with a greater number of potential immigrants to the U.S.; thus, the corresponding coefficient estimate is expected to be positive. As greater distance, (again) all else held constant, corresponds with higher travel costs, to represent the direct costs of migration, we include the geodesic distance between country i and the United States. Accordingly, we anticipate a negative estimated coefficient for this variable. Finally, we include two dummy variables. The first dummy variable, $COMLANG_{ij}$, is equal to one if English is commonly spoken in country i and is equal to zero otherwise. As sharing a common language would signal, all else constant, a greater ease of assimilation and, thus, lower indirect costs of migration, we expected the corresponding coefficient estimate to be positive. The second dummy variable, $CONTIG_{ij}$, is equal to one if the U.S. and country i share a common border (i.e., if country i is Canada or Mexico) and is equal to zero otherwise. As a common border potentially reduces the direct cost of migration, we anticipate a positive coefficient estimate for this variable. Lastly, ε_{ijt} is an assumed independent and identically distributed error term.

The data source for both of our dependent variable series is the U.N. (2015) and the U.S. Census Bureau (1982, 1976, and 1975). The real GDP per capita series and the population series are from Maddison (2015). The geodesic distance between the capital city of country i and Washington, D.C. and English language use are from the CEPII (2015).

We estimate equations (1) and (2) both with and without time (i.e., year) and source country fixed effects terms. Due to panel-level heteroscedasticity and first-order serial correlation, we employ the feasible generalized least squares estimation technique. We perform Chow (1960) tests to consider structural breaks in our dependent variable series at four points during our reference period: a) enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), b) enactment of the Emergency Quota Act (1921), c) enactment of the McCarran-Walter Act (1952), and d) enactment of the Hart-Celler Act (1968). This is done by truncating the data series to include the years prior to and following each suspected/known break; however, we avoid including more than one break in any estimation. For example, when testing for a structural break due to the enactment of the McCarran-Walter Act, we examine the period from 1922 (i.e., the year following enactment of the Emergency Quota Act) through 1968 (i.e., the year that the Hart-Celler Act was enacted).

<Insert Table 2 about here>

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Column (a) presents mean values and standard deviations for each of the variables over the full 1820-2009 reference period. During the typical year in our reference period, 3,275 immigrants arrived in the U.S. from the typical source country. U.S. real GDP per capita was nearly eight times the level in the average source country. About one out of seven source countries commonly use English, and the

¹⁷ Real GDP per capita values are in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars.

average source country is located 8,624 miles from the U.S. Values presented in columns (b) through (f) correspond with the time periods prior to and following each of the potential breaks in our dependent variable series. T-tests comparing the mean values for each time period with the corresponding mean value from the full reference period indicate numerous significant changes across the abbreviated time periods. Focusing on the immigrant inflow variable, we see that the mean value is significantly lower than that of the full period during each abbreviated period except 1883-1921. Finally, values presented in columns (1)-(4) are test statistics calculated from t-tests of differences in mean values across abbreviated periods. For example, the average immigrant inflow increased significantly from the 1820-1882 period to the 1883-1921 period before decreasing significantly during the 1922-1952 period.

Determinants of Immigrant Inflows and Inflow Shares

Results obtained from the estimation of equation (1) and of equation (2) are presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3, respectively. Beginning with Panel A, where the dependent variable series is the immigrant inflow, the four columns ((a) through (d)) present results from the estimation of our regression models with and without time and country fixed effect terms. Consistently, we find that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and significantly different from zero. As the specification is double-log, we can interpret the coefficients of our continuous explanatory variables as elasticities; thus, all else constant, a one percent increase in the lagged immigrant inflow increases the inflow during the current period by 0.93 to 0.98 percent. The coefficients of the ratio of real GDP per capita variable are positive in three of the four estimations and are statistically significant from zero and positive, as expected, in column (a) and in column (d). As anticipated, the estimated coefficients of the country i population variable are positive and significantly different from zero in all four estimations. Also as expected, the coefficients of the geodesic distance variable are negative and significantly different from zero and the coefficients of the common language and shared border dummy variables are positive and significantly different from zero. Since geodesic distance, shared border, and common language are time-invariant and country-specific, the variables are excluded from the estimations when country fixed effect terms are included.

<Insert Table 3 about here>

Results presented in Panel B correspond to the estimation of equation (2). Here, the dependent variable series is the immigrant inflow share. We find a similar pattern of coefficient signs, and statistical significance from zero as reported in Panel A of the table. In all estimations, more than 90 percent of the variation in the dependent variable series is explained by the explanatory variables. Thus, the gravity model of migration appears to perform quite well.

Potential Breaks in the Dependent Variable Series

When testing for breaks in the dependent variable series, we estimate equations (1) and (2) without time or country fixed effects and then perform Chow tests. This is done for the

full sample, for traditional source countries (i.e., Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and for non-traditional source countries (i.e., all other countries in the data set). We also perform the estimations and Chow tests for regions (i.e., Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean), sub-regions (e.g., Western Asia, Southern Europe, and Middle Africa), and countries (i.e., Canada, China, and Mexico). Given the volume of estimations, it is impractical to present the complete set of results here.¹⁸ As an alternative, we present the Chow test statistics in Table 4.

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882

Focusing first on the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), the values presented in column (a) indicate a significant break in the immigrant inflow from China that coincides with the enactment of the Act ($p < 0.01$). Looking to the data file, we see that the immigrant inflow value for China declines sharply beginning in 1882 and remains persistently low through the first half of the 20th century. When stratifying the sample to test for breaks in the series for Asia and its sub-regions, we find significant breaks in the series for Eastern Asia (which includes China), Southern Asia, and Western Asia. A significant break also occurs for the full data sample at this point in time; however, we do not find evidence of a break in the series for the traditional cohort of source countries or for the non-traditional cohort. Likewise, we find there are significant breaks at this point in time for the Latin America and the Caribbean region, the Central America sub-region, and for Mexico. Similarly, we find evidence of significant breaks for the Western Europe sub-region and for Canada. Looking to column (e), we find a similar pattern of significant breaks in the immigrant share series. The only differences are that significant breaks are found for the immigrant share series of Southern Europe and for the cohort of non-traditional source countries, while no significant break is found for the full sample.

Comparing the mean values for immigrant inflows across the 1820-1882 and 1883-1921 periods, we find that, of the cohorts for which a significant break in the series is found, all mean values increase with the exceptions of those for China and Western Europe. Similarly, when comparing mean values for the immigrant inflow series across the two time periods, we find that the mean values of all cohorts for which significant breaks are identified in column (e) increase over time with the exceptions of China and Western Europe. Thus, we can say that during a period of general increase in immigrant inflows, marked decreases are seen for migration from Western European countries and from China, which was subject to a ban on migration to the U.S.

<Insert Table 4 about here>

The Emergency Quota Act of 1921

Turning our attention to the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, we repeat our process of testing for structural breaks in the dependent variable series across time periods. Here, we consider the 1883-1921 period relative to the 1922-1952 period. The Chow test statistics for the estimations where the immigrant inflow and inflow share series are employed as the

¹⁸ The full set of results is available on request from the authors.

dependent variable series are presented in columns (b) and (f), respectively, of Table 4. Our expectation, given the restrictions imposed on immigrant inflows by the Emergency Quota Act, is that a significant decline in immigrant arrivals should be observed in all locales except, perhaps, the western hemisphere. The reason for this is simply that inflows from the countries in the western hemisphere were not subject to quotas. Among the regions, sub-regions, and countries identified in column (b) as having significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series, it is only Canada and Mexico where mean values for the immigrant inflow series are higher during the 1922-1952 period than during the 1883-1921 period. All other locales for which a significant break is identified experienced decreases in the mean values of the immigrant inflow series.

Testing for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow share series at the enactment of the Emergency Quota Act produces a mixed set of results. First, we see significant breaks for the full sample (i.e., “All countries”), for both the traditional source countries cohort and the non-traditional source countries cohort, for two of four regions (i.e., Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia), for seven of 13 sub-regions (i.e., Australia and New Zealand, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe, East Asia, Southern Asia, and Western Asia), and two of the three countries considered (i.e., Canada and Mexico).

The fact that a significant break is detected for so many of the cohorts indicates a considerable change in immigrant inflow shares at this point in time. Further, of the 14 cohorts for which significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series are detected, nine experienced increases in the corresponding mean values across the time periods, while mean values decreased for five cohorts (i.e., Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Asia, East Asia, and West Asia). As with the immigrant inflow series, we find increases in mean values for Canada and Mexico, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean – all locales that were not subject to quotas. We also see an increase in the mean value of the inflow series for Western Europe and the traditional source countries cohort, which is comprised largely of European countries. This makes sense as countries in Northern and Western Europe were allocated 85 percent of the total quota.

The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952

As we test our third possible structural break, this time due to the enactment of the McCarran-Walter Act in 1952, our expectations shift. The McCarran-Walter Act was the first major legislative change in the process of U.S. immigration policy becoming less restrictive and less biased against migration from locations outside Northern and Western Europe. Accordingly, we expect that both immigrant inflow levels and inflow shares will increase significantly for the non-traditional source countries and regions while decreasing for the traditional source countries.

Column (c) of Table 4 presents the F statistics from our Chow tests for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow series. As with the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, here we find a large number of structural breaks. Specifically, the full sample (i.e., “All countries”) cohort, the traditional source countries cohort, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Western Asia all have significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and lower mean values during the 1953-1968 period as compared to the 1922-1952 period. In stark contrast, significant breaks are detected for the non-traditional source country cohort, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central America, East Asia, and Southern Asia; however, for each the mean

values of the immigrant inflow series during the 1953-1968 period are greater than the corresponding values for the 1922-1952 period.

The results of the Chow tests for structural breaks in the immigrant inflow share series are presented in column (g) of Table 4. Structural breaks in the inflow share series are found for all eleven of the groups for which structural breaks are reported in column (c). Additionally, breaks are found for three additional sub-regions (i.e., Northern Europe, Western Europe, and South-Eastern Asia) and for Mexico. The pattern of increased/decreased mean values across the two time periods is striking. Mean values of the immigrant inflow share series increased for eight of the 15 cohorts. Seven of these eight cohorts are in Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean. The seven groups for which decreases in mean values are found include Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the cohort of traditional source countries, and the full sample. The results suggest that, coinciding with the enactment of McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, a shift in immigrant inflows from the more traditional source countries and regions to countries in Asia and in Latin America and the Caribbean occurred.

The Hart-Celler Act of 1965

The pattern of detected structural breaks in the immigrant inflow series and in the immigrant inflow share series that correspond with the enactment of the McCarren-Walter Act provide but a glimpse of considerably more pronounced shift in U.S. immigration that coincides with the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act. First, when considering the immigrant inflow series, we find structural breaks in 24 of 28 cases. The Chow test statistics are presented in column (d) of Table 4. Second, when considering the immigrant inflow share series, breaks are found in 20 of 28 cases. The corresponding results are provided in column (h).

Beginning with the immigrant inflow series, of the 24 detected breaks only five breaks correspond with decreases in mean values for the inflow series when the 1953-1968 period is compared to the 1969-2009 period. These five instances involve the traditional source country cohort, Canada, Europe, Northern Europe, and Western Europe – the very regions that were afforded preferential treatment for decades leading-up to passage of the Hart-Celler Act. The 19 cases where the mean values of the immigrant inflow series increased from the 1953-1968 period to the 1969-2009 period include the full sample, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and more significantly, the non-traditional source country cohort, the regions of Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa, as well as all of their sub-regions, Asia, South-Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, Western Asia, and China. It is striking how the identified structural breaks correspond with the changes in U.S. immigration policy that were implemented by the Hart-Celler Act.

Looking to column (g) and the immigrant inflow share series reveals similar and, to some degree, a clear and pronounced shift in the composition of immigrant inflows. Of the 20 detected structural breaks in the immigrant inflow share series, there are eight cohorts for which the mean value in the series declined from the 1953-1968 period to the 1969-2009 period. These eight cohorts include the full sample cohort, the traditional source country cohort, Europe, Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Western Europe, Australia and New Zealand, and Canada. The dozen cohorts for which the mean value of the immigrant inflow share series increased over the two time periods include the non-traditional source country cohort, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as its sub-regions, Asia, South-Eastern Asia,

Southern Asia, Western Asia, Africa, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, and Western Africa. The pattern of change is quite remarkable even as it is consistent with the changes in immigration policy brought by the Hart-Celler Act.

Summary

We have considered four potential structural breakpoints in our dependent variable series and have found patterns of structural breaks and changes (i.e., increases or decreases) in corresponding mean values over time that are consistent with the hypothesis that shifts in U.S. immigration policy have had pronounced effects on both the level of immigrant arrivals to the U.S. and the composition of immigrant arrivals in terms of their source countries and regions. Given the demographic composition of the U.S. at the time of the 1790 Census and the corresponding preferences embodied in U.S. immigration policy, it is not at all surprising to find that in the late 1960s/early 1970s (based on Hofstede's initial four dimensions) the U.S. was more similar, culturally, to the cohort of traditional source countries as compared to the non-traditional source country cohort. In short, the U.S. evolved to be culturally more similar to Northern and Western Europe, etc. as its culture has been shaped by its immigration policy.

CONCLUSIONS

We have recounted the history of immigration to the United States and have examined the corresponding legislative history and data on immigrant inflows for the period from 1820-2013. Additionally, we have presented a descriptive analysis of cultural differences between the U.S. and several cohorts of countries and have sought to determine whether U.S. immigration policy and related immigrant inflow levels and the composition of immigrant inflows by country and/or region have had pronounced influences on the culture of the United States. Lastly, we have presented the findings of an econometric analysis of immigrant inflows and the results of a series of tests for structural breaks in the level of immigrant inflows and in the composition of the inflow series that correspond with key legislative/policy changes.

Our analysis has found a consistent bias in U.S. immigration policy, until 1968, that favored immigration from Europe and, specifically, from countries in Northern and Western Europe. This bias influenced the level and composition of immigrant arrivals. In addition, the immigrant arrivals, being disproportionately from Europe for a large portion of American history (i.e., from the Colonial Era through the 1960s), have influenced the culture of the United States such that it is more culturally-similar to the cultures of Europe (particularly Northern and Western European countries), Canada, Australia and New Zealand than it is to the cultures of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, we can assert that U.S. immigration policy has shaped the society's culture. However, following the enactment of the Hart-Celler Act in 1968 a shift occurred in the primary source countries and regions of U.S. immigrant arrivals. While previously inflows were typically dominated by Europeans, more recent immigrant arrivals are more often from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean Basin, and Africa. This shift in primary source regions may have caused the culture of the United States to become more similar to the cultures of the recent immigrant arrivals' source

countries and less similar from the more traditional source countries. Our econometric analysis produces results that are in support of these findings. We provide clear evidence that significant breaks in the immigrant inflow series and in the immigrant inflow share series correspond with key pieces of legislation that have governed U.S. immigration policy.

APPENDIX A: HOFSTEDE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

Country	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI	Country	PDI	IDV	MAS	UAI
Albania ^{SE}	90	20	80	70	Latvia ^{NE,*}	44	70	9	63
Angola	83	18	20	60	Lebanon	75	40	65	50
Argentina	49	46	56	86	Libya	80	38	52	68
Australia	36	90	61	51	Lithuania ^{NE,*}	42	60	19	65
Austria ^{WE}	11	55	79	70	Luxembourg ^{WE}	40	60	50	70
Bangladesh	80	20	55	60	Malawi	70	30	40	50
Belgium ^{WE}	65	75	54	94	Malaysia	100	26	50	36
Bhutan	94	52	32	28	Malta ^{SE}	56	59	47	96
Brazil	69	38	49	76	Mexico	81	30	69	82
Bulgaria ^{EE}	70	30	40	85	Morocco	70	46	53	68
Burkina Faso	70	15	50	55	Mozambique	85	15	38	44
Canada	39	80	52	48	Namibia	65	30	40	45
Cape Verde	75	20	15	40	Nepal	65	30	40	40
Chile	63	23	28	86	Netherlands ^{WE}	38	80	14	53
China	80	20	66	30	New Zealand	22	79	58	49
Colombia	67	13	64	80	Nigeria	80	30	60	55
Costa Rica	35	15	21	86	Norway ^{NE}	31	69	8	50
Croatia ^{SE}	73	33	40	80	Pakistan	55	14	50	70
Czech Rep. ^{EE}	57	58	57	74	Panama	95	11	44	86
Denmark ^{NE}	18	74	16	23	Peru	64	16	42	87
Dominican Rep.	65	30	65	45	Philippines	94	32	64	44
Ecuador	78	8	63	67	Poland ^{EE}	68	60	64	93
Egypt	70	25	45	80	Portugal ^{SE}	63	27	31	99
El Salvador	66	19	40	94	Romania ^{EE}	90	30	42	90
Estonia ^{NE,*}	40	60	30	60	Russia ^{EE,*}	93	39	36	95
Ethiopia	70	20	65	55	Saudi Arabia	95	25	60	80
Fiji	78	14	46	48	Senegal	70	25	45	55
Finland ^{NE}	33	63	26	59	Serbia ^{SE}	86	25	43	92
France ^{WE}	68	71	43	86	Sierra Leone	70	20	40	50
Germany ^{WE}	35	67	66	65	Singapore	74	20	48	8
Ghana	80	15	40	65	Slovakia ^{EE}	100	52	100	51
Greece ^{SE}	60	35	57	100	Slovenia ^{SE}	71	27	19	88
Guatemala	95	6	37	99	South Africa	49	5	3	49
Honduras	80	20	40	50	Spain ^{SE}	57	51	42	86
Hong Kong	68	25	57	9	Sri Lanka	80	35	10	45

Hungary ^{EE}	46	80	88	82	Suriname	85	47	37	92
Iceland ^{NE}	30	60	10	50	Sweden ^{NE}	31	71	5	29
India	77	48	56	40	Switzerland ^{WE}	34	68	70	58
Indonesia	78	14	46	48	Syria	80	35	52	60
Iran	58	41	43	59	Taiwan	58	17	45	69
Iraq	95	30	70	85	Tanzania	70	25	40	50
Ireland ^{NE}	28	70	68	35	Thailand	64	20	34	64
Israel	13	54	47	81	Trinidad and Tobago	47	16	58	55
Italy ^{SE}	50	76	70	75	Turkey	66	37	45	85
Jamaica	45	39	68	13	UAE	90	25	50	80
Japan	54	46	95	92	UK ^{NE}	35	89	66	35
Jordan	70	30	45	65	USA	40	91	62	46
Kenya	70	25	60	50	Uruguay	61	36	38	99
Korea, Rep. of	60	18	39	85	Venezuela	81	12	73	76
Kuwait	90	25	40	80	Vietnam	70	20	40	30
					Zambia	60	35	40	50

Source: <http://geert-hofstede.com/>.

Note: Variances for the PDI, IDV, MAS, and UAI series are equal to 429.84, 486.14, 344.30, and 454.67, respectively.

APPENDIX B: GLOBE PROJECT CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

	ASSERT	GEND-EGL	INST-COL	INGP-COL	POWDIST	UNC-AVD
Albania ^{SE}	4.57	3.48	4.28	5.51	4.44	4.45
Argentina	4.18	3.44	3.66	5.51	5.56	3.63
Australia	4.29	3.41	4.31	4.14	4.81	4.40
Austria ^{WE}	4.59	3.18	4.34	4.89	5.00	5.10
Brazil	4.25	3.44	3.94	5.16	5.24	3.74
Canada	4.09	3.66	4.36	4.22	4.85	4.54
China	3.77	3.03	4.67	5.86	5.02	4.81
Colombia	4.16	3.64	3.84	5.59	5.37	3.62
Costa Rica	3.83	3.56	3.95	5.26	4.70	3.84
Denmark ^{NE}	4.04	4.02	4.93	3.63	4.14	5.32
Ecuador	3.98	3.09	3.82	5.55	5.29	3.63
Egypt	3.91	2.90	4.36	5.49	4.76	3.97
El Salvador	4.49	3.23	3.74	5.22	5.56	3.69
Finland ^{NE}	4.05	3.55	4.77	4.23	5.08	5.11
France ^{WE}	4.44	3.81	4.20	4.66	5.68	4.66
Germany ^{WE}	4.77	3.17	3.67	4.59	5.70	5.19
Greece ^{SE}	4.55	3.53	3.41	5.28	5.35	3.52
Guatemala	3.96	3.14	3.78	5.54	5.47	3.44

Hong Kong	4.53	3.26	4.03	5.33	4.94	4.17
Hungary ^{EE}	4.71	4.02	3.63	5.31	5.57	3.26
India	3.70	2.89	4.25	5.81	5.29	4.02
Indonesia	3.70	3.04	4.27	5.50	4.93	3.92
Ireland ^{NE}	3.93	3.19	4.57	5.12	5.13	4.25
Israel	4.19	3.21	4.40	4.63	4.71	3.97
Italy ^{SE}	4.12	3.30	3.75	4.99	5.45	3.85
Japan	3.69	3.17	5.23	4.72	5.23	4.07
Korea, Rep. of	4.36	2.45	5.20	5.71	5.69	3.52
Kuwait	3.56	2.59	4.32	5.70	4.97	4.02
Malaysia	3.77	3.31	4.45	5.47	5.09	4.59
Mexico	4.31	3.50	3.95	5.62	5.07	4.06
Morocco	4.72	3.08	4.18	6.37	6.14	3.95
Namibia	3.81	3.69	4.02	4.39	5.29	4.09
Netherlands ^{WE}	4.46	3.62	4.62	3.79	4.32	4.81
New Zealand	3.47	3.18	4.96	3.58	5.12	4.86
Nigeria	4.53	3.04	4.00	5.34	5.32	4.14
Philippines	3.85	3.42	4.37	6.14	5.15	3.69
Poland ^{EE}	4.11	3.94	4.51	5.55	5.09	3.71
Portugal ^{SE}	3.75	3.69	4.02	5.64	5.50	3.96
Russia ^{EE,*}	3.86	4.07	4.57	5.83	5.61	3.09
Singapore	4.06	3.52	4.77	5.66	4.92	5.16
Slovenia ^{SE}	4.01	3.84	4.09	5.49	5.32	3.76
Spain ^{SE}	4.39	3.06	3.87	5.53	5.53	3.95
Sweden ^{NE}	3.41	3.72	5.26	3.46	4.94	5.36
Switzerland ^{WE}	4.58	3.12	4.20	4.04	5.05	5.42
Taiwan	3.70	2.92	4.30	5.45	5.00	4.04
Thailand	3.58	3.26	3.88	5.72	5.62	3.79
Turkey	4.42	3.02	4.02	5.79	5.43	3.67
UK ^{NE}	4.23	3.67	4.31	4.08	5.26	4.70
USA	4.50	3.36	4.21	4.22	4.92	4.15
Venezuela	4.25	3.60	3.96	5.41	5.22	3.55
Zambia	4.00	2.88	4.41	5.72	5.23	3.92

APPENDIX C: COUNTRY LISTING, BY REGION AND SUB-REGION

Africa

Eastern Africa: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Réunion, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe;

Middle Africa: Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Congo, Dem. Rep. of, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe;

Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia;

Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland;

Western Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo;

Asia

Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan;

Eastern Asia: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, DPR, Korea, Rep. of, Mongolia, Taiwan;

South-Eastern Asia: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam;

Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka;

Western Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen;

Europe

Eastern Europe: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine;

Northern Europe: Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, UK;

Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain;

Western Europe: Austria; Belgium; France; Germany; Netherlands; Switzerland;

Latin America and the Caribbean

Caribbean: Dominican Rep., Haiti, Jamaica, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago;

Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama;

South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela;

Northern America

Northern America: Canada; and

Oceania

Australia and New Zealand

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Table 1: Immigrant Inflows, by Region, Sub-region, and Country, 1820-2013

	1820-1881	1882-1920	1921-1951	1952-1967	1968-2013	1820-2013
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Total Immigrant Arrivals	9,985,008	22,986,644	6,305,238	4,432,522	34,667,604	78,377,017
Africa	1,006	16,370	16,896	27,422	1,862,246	1,923,940
Eastern Africa	0	0	0	0	545,899	545,899
Middle Africa	0	0	0	0	86,064	86,064
Northern Africa	0	0	0	0	376,406	376,406
Southern Africa	0	0	0	0	84,602	84,602
Western Africa	0	0	0	0	680,115	680,115
Other Africa	0	0	0	0	89,160	89,160
Asia	230,050	640,505	335,041	806,109	12,276,079	14,287,784
Central Asia	0	22,117	35,646	160,438	134,507	352,708
Eastern Asia	229,280	348,477	101,005	123,277	3,468,563	4,270,602
China	228,945	11,890	128	22,402	1,385,282	1,648,647
South-Eastern Asia	0	0	8,447	47,599	3,057,152	3,113,198
Southern Asia	359	6,832	4,552	10,888	4,385,421	4,408,052
Western Asia	69	180,768	24,747	3,322	1,125,711	1,334,617
Other Asia	342	82,311	160,644	460,585	104,723	808,605
Europe	8,989,887	20,562,400	3,843,685	1,954,691	4,217,499	39,568,163
Central Europe	80,769	27,935	0	0	56,104	164,808
Eastern Europe	60,473	7,627,675	758,383	203,604	1,237,640	9,887,775
Northern Europe	5,666,146	5,800,125	1,340,054	713,167	1,224,622	14,744,114
Southern Europe	130,376	4,664,099	903,655	494,716	1,114,005	7,306,851
Western Europe	3,052,126	2,442,564	841,594	543,204	585,127	7,464,615
Latin America and the Caribbean	98,555	498,563	760,545	949,081	15,442,109	17,748,854
Caribbean	63,490	279,272	159,836	336,771	4,385,651	5,225,020
Central America	25,119	219,169	600,709	612,310	8,598,663	10,055,970
Mexico	25,119	219,169	600,709	612,310	6,758,311	8,215,618
Other Americas	9,946	122	0	0	39,483	49,551
South America	0	0	0	0	2,418,312	2,418,312
Northern America	654,660	1,228,001	1,320,665	667,513	681,836	4,552,675
Canada	654,660	1,228,001	1,320,650	667,507	673,770	4,544,588
Oceania	9,822	32,014	26,891	23,233	185,315	277,275
Australia and New Zealand	9,822	32,014	26,891	23,233	115,898	207,858
Melanesia	0	0	0	0	41,979	41,979
Micronesia	0	0	0	0	1,339	1,339
Polynesia	0	0	0	0	26,099	26,099
Pacific Islands	1,028	8,791	1,515	4,473	2,520	18,327

Figure 1: Immigrant Inflow Shares and U.S. Federal Immigration Policy, 1820-2013




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Period:		(b) v. (c)		(c) v. (d)		(d) v. (e)		(e) v. (f)	
	1820-2009 (a)	1820-1882 (b)	(1)	1883-1921 (c)	(2)	1922-1952 (d)	(3)	1953-1968 (e)	(4)	1969-2009 (f)
Inflow _{ijt}	3,274.59 (16,996.65)	2,533.45** (15,169.28)	3.55###	4,457.50** (22,111.16)	-5.44###	1,668.27*** (9,697.05)	-1.54	1,286.56*** (6,249.30)	5.27###	2,501.62*** (14,746.03)
Inflow _{ijt-1}	3,212.69 (16,918.22)	3,062.94 (18,735.89)	2.43##	4,467.79** (22,263.20)	-5.05###	1,813.90*** (10,873.78)	-1.95#	1,284.33*** (6,500.05)	5.14###	2,484.85*** (14,730.45)
Inflow Share _{ijt}	0.9843 (4.7046)	1.5371*** (7.2084)	-1.87#	1.2133* (5.4530)	0.26	1.2573** (5.6554)	-3.72###	0.7269*** (3.4946)	4.67###	1.2164*** (5.7835)
Inflow Share _{ijt-1}	0.9837 (4.7215)	1.5325*** (7.2225)	-1.86#	1.2097* (5.4481)	0.30	1.2592** (5.6121)	-3.71###	0.7270*** (3.6254)	4.56###	1.2146*** (5.7967)
Relative GDP Per Capita _{ijt}	7.9661 (9.8889)	2.7925*** (1.3574)	26.35###	4.1998*** (2.2445)	16.16###	6.0230*** (4.7585)	17.92###	9.3689*** (7.3096)	-23.96###	5.3279*** (5.0054)
Population _{it}	2.5E+07 (8.9E+07)	1.5E+07*** (5.7E+07)	3.50###	2.1E+07*** (6.5E+07)	1.43	2.4E+07 (7.4E+07)	-1.83#	2.0E+07*** (7.0E+07)	0.00	2.0E+07*** (6.6E+07)
Geodesic Distance _{ij}	8,624.18 (3,455.65)	8,567.73 (3,611.31)	-0.56	8,511.62 (3,561.26)	-2.68###	8,220.19*** (3,645.74)	5.25###	8,781.70** (3,405.41)	-2.99###	8,525.58* (3,566.49)
Common Border _{ij}	0.0238 (0.1526)	0.0401*** (0.1962)	-0.99	0.0349*** (0.1836)	-1.17	0.0287 (0.1669)	-3.20###	0.0146*** (0.1200)	4.74###	0.0306*** (0.1722)
Common Language _{ij}	0.1367 (0.3435)	0.0886*** (0.2842)	1.96##	0.1048*** (0.3064)	0.80	0.1123*** (0.3159)	6.57###	0.1825*** (0.3863)	-6.90###	0.1189*** (0.3237)
N	15,850	3,093		2,233		2,163		2,192		6,169

Standard deviations in parentheses. "***", "**", and "*" denote statistical significance from the corresponding mean value over the 1820-2009 period at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Values presented in columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) are t statistics from t tests of mean values in indicated columns. "###", "##", and "#" denote that the difference in mean values across indicated columns is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 3: Determinants of Immigrant Inflows and Inflow Shares

Panel A: Dependent Variable: In Inflow_{it}

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
In Inflow _{ijt-1}	0.9796*** (0.0018)	0.9661*** (0.0021)	0.9513*** (0.0024)	0.9362*** (0.0028)
In Relative GDP Per Capita _{ijt}	0.0269*** (0.0062)	-0.0088 (0.0063)	0.0242 (0.0158)	0.0766*** (0.0154)
In Population _{it}	0.0313*** (0.0041)	0.035*** (0.0037)	0.1755*** (0.0108)	0.0842*** (0.015)
In Geodesic Distance _{ij}	-0.0369*** (0.0135)	-0.0368*** (0.0121)		
Common Border _{ij}	0.019 (0.045)	0.1143*** (0.0407)		
Common Language _{ij}	0.0366** (0.0173)	0.0313** (0.0155)		
Constant	-0.0876 (0.1272)	-0.1676 (0.1459)	-2.6637*** (0.1879)	-1.4523*** (0.2506)
N	15,850	15,850	16,427	16,427
Pseudo R ²	0.96	0.97	0.96	0.97
Wald χ^2	410,349***	523,968***	432,286***	546,737***
Time FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Country FE	No	No	Yes	Yes

Panel B: Dependent Variable: Inflow Share_{it}

	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
Inflow Share _{ijt-1}	0.9463*** (0.0025)	0.9462*** (0.0025)	0.9244*** (0.0029)	0.9207*** (0.003)
In Relative GDP Per Capita _{ijt}	-0.0218* (0.0117)	-0.0121 (0.013)	0.0095 (0.0293)	0.0466 (0.0321)
In Population _{it}	0.0295*** (0.0069)	0.0322*** (0.0071)	0.0366** (0.0162)	0.1963*** (0.0318)
In Geodesic Distance _{ij}	-0.045* (0.0253)	-0.0503** (0.0254)		
Common Border _{ij}	0.4061*** (0.0852)	0.3914*** (0.0854)		
Common Language _{ij}	0.0581* (0.0325)	0.0637* (0.0326)		
Constant	0.0148 (0.2379)	-0.5144* (0.3064)	-0.6197** (0.2974)	-3.4886*** (0.5275)
N	15,850	15,850	16,427	16,427
Pseudo R ²	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Wald χ^2	178,772***	179,646***	187,716***	188,979***
Time FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Country FE	No	No	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses. "***", "**", and "*" denote statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Coefficients of the time and country fixed effect terms are not presented due to space limitations.

Table 4: Summary of Chow Test Statistics

Region/Sub-region/Country	<i>Immigrant Inflow Series</i>				<i>Immigrant Share Series</i>			
	Period Examined: 1820-1921	1883-1952	1922-1968	1953-2009	1820-1921	1883-1952	1922-1968	1953-2009
	Possible Break at: 1882	1921	1952	1968	1882	1921	1952	1968
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
All Countries	17.21**	.	77.44***	308.61***	.	25.85***	100.07***	323.08***
"Traditional" Source Countries	.	.	15.08**	68.31***	.	14.75**	32.96***	310.24***
Australia and New Zealand	.	15.83***	.	.	.	13.55***	.	13.45***
Canada	25.05***	7.96*	.	23.17***	18.83***	17.26***	.	29.40***
Europe	.	.	11.17*	63.96***	.	.	37.94***	91.61***
Eastern Europe	.	.	16.76***	10.31*	.	.	15.37***	.
Northern Europe	.	15.98**	.	36.04***	.	20.68***	15.23**	182.60***
Southern Europe	.	.	.	17.45***	11.34**	33.12***	.	27.28***
Western Europe	14.53**	9.29*	.	76.52***	24.55***	12.21**	39.66***	22.26***
"Non-Traditional" Source Countries	.	.	122.90***	259.43***	16.27**	86.92***	380.63***	110.92***
Latin America and the Caribbean	62.84***	.	139.29***	189.44***	.	27.07***	149.40***	36.29***
Central America	12.45**	32.71***	50.74***	130.76***	.	.	56.48***	.
Mexico	20.23***	8.11*	.	.	9.81**	34.00***	38.56***	.
Caribbean	.	.	.	44.89***	.	.	.	9.24*
South America	.	.	.	106.78***	.	.	.	15.74***
Asia	40.51***	16.51**	53.19***	73.14***	30.39***	19.53***	221.80***	22.51***
Central Asia
Eastern Asia	68.78***	33.24***	16.29***	.	25.83***	17.28***	32.14***	.
China	32.41***	12.11**	.	27.83***	20.07***	.	.	.
South-Eastern Asia	.	.	.	49.58***	.	.	141.62***	19.70***
Southern Asia	27.61***	.	31.42***	29.07***	13.88**	14.21**	22.79***	10.36*
Western Asia	68.40***	40.53***	62.92***	48.54***	32.95***	66.43***	99.06***	14.56**
Africa	.	.	.	93.61***	.	.	.	13.56**
Eastern Africa	.	.	.	23.22***
Middle Africa	.	.	.	18.28***
Northern Africa	.	.	.	24.03***	.	.	.	16.93***
Southern Africa	.	.	.	19.82***	.	.	.	17.16***
Western Africa	.	.	.	29.01***	.	.	.	9.32*

"***", "**", and "*" denote significance from zero (i.e., the presence of a break in the data) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. "." indicates p-value > 0.1.